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ABSTRACT
One purpose of this study is to explore how the 
individual's responses to thoughts concerning future 
death affect the self or identity. Another purpose is 
to explore how the person constructs a definition of 
personal death.
Two clinical case studies of disasters are used 
to determine possible responses to the threat and reality 
of death. Additionally, observational studies of medical 
staffs and patients illustrate typical responses to dying 
and death. It is suggested that death concern can 
motivate behaviors for some individuals.
A compilation of studies that correlate death 
concern with attitudes, behaviors and personality 
characteristics identifies individuals whose purpose­
ful behaviors are influenced by.thoughts of nonexistence. 
A theoretical model that explains the emergent self and 
links the self to behavior predicts overt and covert 
behaviors of death concerned persons.
Processes of conformity and cognitive dissonance 
are described in order to examine the issue of social 
control within dying and death studies. It is suggested 
that propositions concerning cognitive dissonance should 
be integrated with those explaining the self for accurate 
predictions concerning the reciprocal relationship 
between death and the self.
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DEATH AND THE SELF
INTRODUCTION
This project explores how an individual’s per­
ceptions of eventual nonbeing affect the self and behavior 
and how a person defines his death. The task and the 
topic preclude an approach restricted to an inductive 
or deductive examination of narrowly defined concepts. 
Rather, a blend of processes that meet the emergent needs 
of empirical findings and theoretical interpretations of 
complex issues are used to reach project goals.
For the person, death is the ultimate control 
over his life's plans and activities. Empirical studies 
demonstrate possible responses to thoughts of personal 
death and responses to the deaths of others. This 
exploratory effort begins with examples of these studies 
and a discussion on how future death can motivate 
presently oriented behaviors.
Suggesting that thoughts of nonbeing motivate 
behavior necessitates an attempt to define those who are 
overly concerned with death. Research findings allow 
the conclusion that perceived consequences of death are 
influenced by enacted or imagined social and personal 
roles. Furthermore, researchers find that the elderly 
are not most concerned with death. Younger adults,
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especially women, appear to manifest.considerable concern
ambivalent or contradictory responses are typical.
In order to explore how cognitive awareness of
finitude affects the self, a theoretic framework that
uses explanations based on social and personal roles is
necessary because thoughts of death are based on these
roles. The McCall and Simmons role identity model, as
outlined in chapter three, is appropriate for the study
because it applies to young, relatively independent
persons who acknowledge a finite nature. Its use of a
symbolic interaction orientation is particularly
important, since the meanings of personal death must be
constructed and defined by the Individual. Empiricists
cannot explain the nature of death.
The McCall and Simmons model is limited by its
voluntaristic postulate. Its authors acknowledge that
they do not consider how social control affects the self.
Dying and death research findings are amenable to
analyses based on principles of conformity and cognitive
dissonance. These processes represent mechanisms of
social control and are used to judge the adequacy of the
role identity model’s explanations.
Contemporarily, death is a complex phenomenon.
A 195 7 contributor to the Atlantic Monthly wrote:
There is a new way of dying today. It is the 
slow passage via m o d e m  medicine. If you are 
very ill, m o d e m  medicine can save you. If you
are going to die, it can prevent you from doing 
so for a very long time . . .  an incredible 
battle between spirit and medicine takes place.
It may continue for weeks, sometimes for months. 
But the victim is going to die. It is just a 
question of time.
Sensitive medical instrumentation, the ability to trans­
plant human organs, suicide, abortion, cryonics, 
euthanasia and other issues continue to confront those 
who attempt to define human death in a technologically 
advanced society. The Harvard Committee on Brain Death 
(1968) recommended that cessation of brain functions 
should determine death. Current statutes show that the 
definition of death varies among the states, although 
medical practitioners generally adopt criteria proposed 
by the Harvard Committee (Meyers, 1977).
Agich (1976), a medical ethicist, argues brain 
death presumes rather than establishes a definition for 
death. That is, brain death operationalizes death of 
the body but a definition for death of the person has 
not been formulated. Veatch (1976) extends the argument 
by suggesting that the definition should be determined 
by what is significant to the nature of man. The task 
needs philosophical and theological reflection, not 
merely biological investigation.
Although the concept has various interpretations, 
the following discussions are based on a definition of 
death that is social in nature. Death can refer to the
cessation of biological functions; in this instance it 
refers to the termination of all human experience. As an 
event, it is distinguishable from the process of dying. 
This definition does not challenge prevailing medical or 
legal definitions of death, nor does it debate the 
question of an afterlife. It is congruent with generally 
accepted conceptualizations of self and identity and i,t 
encourages an investigation of social and symbolic life.
G.H. Mead provides a definition for the self. He
identifies self as distinguishable from a physical entity
Self is a ’’social structure [that] arises in social 
experience.” By adopting objective and impersonal 
attitudes toward oneself and the social situation, a
person develops self-consciousness; a person becomes an 
object of its own reflection (Strauss, 1964: 204).
Because of multiply relevant relationships and associa­
tions with others, a ’’multiple [self] is in a certain 
sense normal” but a unified self that is stabilized by 
one’s most significant others also emerges (Mead, 1934: 
142) .
Identity serves as a mechanism to operationalize 
the more abstract self. It refers to a system of 
idealized personal and social roles that an individual 
adopts in order to present appropriate situational selves 
and to maintain a more enduring and unified self (McCall 
and Simmons, 1978).
CHAPTER I 
RESPONSES TO DEATH
G.H. Mead posits that the individual's conscious­
ness develops through a teleological process. "The 
conduct of the conscious organism is determined both by 
a physiological system from behind and also by a 
consciousness that reaches into the future. This can 
of course take place only in a present in which both the 
conditioning past and the emerging future are to be 
found" (1932: 60).
Human beings, compared to other forms of living 
entities, have the unique ability to know that their 
eventual fate is nonexistence. One approach to exploring 
Mead's thought is to examine how and why cognitions of 
future death affect present oriented behaviors and a 
definition of the self. This approach raises the 
preliminary question of whether or not an individual can 
understand the nature or meaning of his own death. 
Examining circumstances that illustrate responses toward 
the deaths of others, and settings that specialize in 
the management of dying and death are additional pre­
requisites for interpreting how and why thoughts of 
future nonexistence affect the individual's conception
6
7of self and his behaviors.
When a person responds to the process of dying, he 
can reflect upon suffering, pain, dependency, confinement 
and loss of control over activities and functions. These 
are observable life processes. When a person responds to 
another's death he can consider the loss and separation, 
realizing that like others, he also is limited. Personal 
death is an event that ends experience. Suggesting that 
thoughts of it affect behaviors and the self implies that 
a person gives meaning to eventual nonexistence. Though 
nonexistence cannot be operationalized, observed, 
measured or interpreted empirically, individuals can and 
do reason and symbolize in order to understand abstract 
constructs. Freud posits that although consciousness is . 
capable of conceiving its own negation, an individual is 
not capable of conceiving his own death. "At the bottom, 
no one believes in his own death . everyone of us is
convinced of his own immortality" (1959). Van Evra (1971) 
contends that the nature of death is unknowable but the 
person conceptualizes "limit" and thus gives a meaning to 
death that can be used as an operational device. He 
writes:
To say that death functions as a limit . . .  is 
simply to say that we build, to a considerable 
extent, our conceptual lives with the use of it. 
The general realization that we are approaching 
the limit often impels us; e.g., to truncate 
projects so that we can go on to others; it 
forces us to pick and choose those tasks . .
8which are more ’’worthwhile.” In general, we 
form a ’’set,” i.e., a context, from which life 
is viewed via the realization that life is 
limited, and that we are approaching the limit.
All of this can be accomplished without any 
conception of experienceless, literally thought­
less ’’self” whatsoever.
This interpretation is congruent with the work by 
Rosenblueth et al. (1943) who posit a teleological 
explanation for motivation. The authors suggest that a 
presently experienced cognition is necessary to determine 
behavior. A present intention to realize a future 
phenomenon, rather than a future oriented goal, is 
experienced by the person and motivates or causes 
behavior. Thus, it is possible to conclude that purpose­
ful behavior is influenced by perceiving the future and 
that nonexistence, the person's ultimate future, can 
motivate behavior.
Because a person can never experience nonbeing, 
some thoughts of an inevitable demise are influenced by 
the deaths of others. Social scientists who study dying 
and death find natural laboratories for exploring how 
survivors respond to human tragedy. Seventeen years after 
the event, Robert Lifton (1976) interviewed two groups of 
’’hibakusha,” surviving victims of the A-bomb, as part of 
a larger field study on Hiroshima. One group included 33 
individuals randomly chosen from the files of the 
Hiroshima University Research Institute for Nuclear 
Medicine and Biology. The second group of 42 respondents
9included physicians, university professors, city officials 
and others who were particularly knowledgeable of the ways 
people handled the problems and effects of the bomb. All 
were interviewed at least twice and each session of semi­
structured questioning lasted approximately two hours. 
Three dimensions of A-bomb problems and results were 
discussed: a) recollection of the experience and its
current meanings; b) residual concerns and fears, 
especially those of radiation effects; and c) the 
hibakusha's sense of self and society.
Most individuals recalled the shift from a 
"normal" existence to one defined by death. The sudden, 
absolute encounter produced Man emotional theme within 
the victim that remains with him indefinitely: the sense 
of a more or less permanent encounter with death" (Lifton, 
1976: 184).  ^Psychological closure, or the inability 
to "feel," is described as a common yet somewhat 
ineffective defensive maneuver to cope with widespread 
death and destruction. The price for this defense appears 
to be a sense of guilt or feeling ashamed for "selfishly" 
surviving while others died.
Soon after the event, rumors of continued death 
and destruction circulated throughout Hiroshima. Some 
were told that all those exposed to the bomb would be 
dead within three years. Others believed that trees and 
grass would never grow. These rumors help explain
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survivors' anxieties over personal health. Physicians 
describe an "A-bomb neurosis," or hypochondriasis, general 
weakness and dependency among survivors. Most hibakusha 
are concerned with potential health problems of their 
offspring and many report restricted employment and 
marriage opportunities result from exposure to the bomb 
with its related health problems (Lifton, 1976: 193-194).
Some hibakusha are physically identifiable through 
keloids left from exposure. Most are affected by laws 
enacted since 195 7 that provide medical coverage and 
"certify" individuals as victims. Thus, an hibakusha 
becomes a member of an unchosen group and outsiders react 
to the symbolism of group membership. An hibakusha bears 
the "taint of death" and evokes a sense of rejection. 
Generally, he considers himself a member of a minority 
group and of an outcast group. Lifton concludes that a 
victim's identity is based on an intimate identification 
with the dead. "Survivors seem not only to have experi­
enced the atomic disaster, but to have imbibed it and 
incorporated it into their beings, including all of its 
elements of horror, evil and particularly of death. They 
feel compelled virtually to merge with those who died" 
(1976: 199-200).
Cities and townships in the United States have 
been destroyed by floods, hurricanes, tornadoes and fires. 
A gemeinschaft community, characterized by few status
11
differentiations, close networks of interpersonal rela­
tionships and feelings of attachment to the land got an 
"advance look at hell" in 19 72 when a dam- burst, setting 
off mud waves and explosions.
Erikson (1976) observed the aftermath of the 
Buffalo Greek flood that killed at least 125 people from 
a West Virginia coal mining area. He found a remarkable 
similarity in responses among 142 individuals whose 
accounts of the flood are reported in 30,000 pages of 
transcript. Moreover, this community's experience with 
death produced psychopathological syndromes similar to 
those of the typical hibakusha. Anxiety, depression, 
phobia, hypochondriasis, apathy and insomnia are commonly 
diagnosed by physicians. Some physicians and psycholo­
gists estimate that over 907. of survivors suffer from 
some form of^ emotional disorder and Erikson concludes 
that confusion, despair and hopelessness characterize 
the typical survivor (1976: 136-157).
Similar to Lifton’s findings of psychological 
closure among the hibakusha, Buffalo Greek victims 
identify with death--an identification that produces a 
numbness or apathy toward the deaths of others. Erikson 
writes, "the dead have no warrant to mourn the dead”
(1976: 145). Several survivors report a feeling of 
guilt or shame for being alive. The source of guilt 
might be that the "human mind has its own probability
theories," and each death made the odds of self-survival 
greater (1976: 169). Death anxiety is manifested by 
children who often draw pictures depicting bodies floating 
in muddy water. Members of a once gemeinschaft community 
became alienated from each other and reflect this new 
sense of aloneness in dreams. "One theme that appears 
again and again in those dreams is the feeling that one 
is dead and being buried by people who were once quite 
close. It is as if one’s alienation from others is a 
form of death, a grim rehearsal for that final act of 
separation" (Erikson, 1976: 243).
These clinical case studies suggest that experi­
ences with death can affect the individual and the 
community in ways that can be irreversible. Resolution 
of the disaster might be impossible for survivors. In 
both examples, communities somewhat acknowledged an 
impending threat of death. Lifton's historical review 
of Hiroshima’s status in the war revealed a general 
apprehension, a feeling that the Americans "must be 
preparing something extraordinarily big for the city" 
existed (1976: 183). A few stray warning bombs and 
leaflets concerning the A-bomb reached Hiroshima. The 
people of Buffalo Creek lived with the reality of black 
lung, fatal coal mining accidents and the dangers of 
nature. "The mountains are their security as well as 
their curse . they can become a terrible threat with
13
scarcely a moment's notice" (Erikson, 1976: 130). In both 
cases, sudden and traumatic events made anticipating and 
preparing for death's reality impossible.
The tragedy of multiple deaths does not represent 
the typical encounter with mortality. Disasters, however, 
do serve to illuminate some of the responses individuals 
manifest toward the threat of personal death. In 
technologically advanced nations that can hide the process 
of dying by institutionalizing the terminally ill or by 
masking the signs of protracted dying, disasters remind 
spectators of their mortal nature.
Those with medical occupations, like surviving 
victims, are also atypical in their experiences with 
death. In American hospitals and nursing homes, physi­
cians, nurses and other staff members face the fragility 
of human life on a daily basis. "Detached concern" 
enables practitioners to accept the deaths of those with 
whom they engage in sustained relationships. Goffman's 
discussion of role distance elaborates some of the tactics 
used by surgeons to ensure completion of a complex and 
risky task that requires cooperation of team .members. 
Identifying with the mortal man can be disruptive for 
a person whose role necessitates a constantly maintained 
sense of composure and control, and for the person who 
is trained to preserve physical life. Joking with 
surgical staff members and using humorous and nontechnical
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terms for medical instruments are examples of ways in 
which a surgeon exhibits a "disaffection from or 
resistance against" his putative role (Goffman, 1961).
To fulfill his commitment to the situated activity system, 
the surgeon acts "in the name of some other socially 
created identity." Thus, invoking role distance serves 
the purpose of allowing the physician to contribute to 
the management of an organization designed to provide 
efficient medical services to a large number of patients, 
including those who die.
Gubrium (1975) observed interactions of clients 
and staff in a nursing home. "Patients," those diagnosed 
critically or terminally ill, were separated from 
"residents," or comparatively healthy clients. Although 
"dying and death are commonly recognized occasions 
considered characteristic of the setting by all
its participants" the process and the event are defined 
differently by interactants. The "top staff" does 
administrative death work. They arrange procedures to 
take care of the deceased, notify family and maintain 
order in the home, but they never see death. The "floor 
staff" includes nurses and aides. These workers often 
witness deaths of patients and their duties are directly 
concerned with the dead. The "clientele" physically and 
emotionally experience the dying process and the deaths 
of others. They perceive the nursing home as a place to
15
die. A feeling of abandonment is commonly expressed and 
clients establish intimate relationships with each other 
while breaking ties with those on the "outside"•(Gubrium, 
1975: 89). Rather than plan activities for the future, 
clients are concerned with filling the present time by 
walking, watching and talking. They engage in a daily 
routine of "passing time." Floor staff and the adminis­
tration are concerned with maintaining order in the home. 
Patients and residents are not encouraged to interact 
since witnessing terminality can be disruptive for the 
more healthy clients. "Herding" patients into dayrooms 
and bribing troublemakers are means for dealing with 
annoyances or disruptions of routinized activities.
In the past, dying was a process that usually 
lasted for a short period and families, rather than a 
nursing staff, cared for the terminally ill. Acute, 
contagious disease, high infant mortality and occupa­
tional deaths don’t allow individuals to enact a role 
signaling death. Sontag’s review of literary references 
to illness shows that the "dying role" belonged almost 
exclusively to tuberculosis patients until the end of 
the 19th Century. Before scientists identified bacterial 
causes, the victim was "identified with death itself" 
and had a "tubercular look considered a mark of
distinction, of breeding" (Sontag, 1979: 28). The 
"sickness" was associated with a sentiment of sadness
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and defined a romantic stance to life. A protracted ill­
ness, with phases of exuberance and gaiety, followed by 
phases of weakness and frailty was common among the 
creative artists compared to the diseases afflicting other 
occupations.
Lofland (1978) posits that the interrelationships 
of six factors account for prolonged dying among a 
significant proportion of contemporary Americans: 1) a
high level of medical technology, 2) early detection of 
disease, 3) a complex definition of death, 4) a high 
incidence of degenerative disease, 5) a low incidence of 
fatal injuries, and 6) a curative orientation toward the 
dying with a complementary high value placed on prolonged 
life. Contemporarily, in addition to medical pro­
fessionals, more of the general population encounter 
persons enacting a dying role. Lofland finds that 
selecting a "dying script" is problematic because dying 
is "transitional, irreversible, and characterized by an 
absence of ’graduates’” (1978: 45). Entrance to a dying 
role is defined by the medical profession that often 
tries to avoid disclosing terminal conditions.
Expectations for the stance, or emotional tone expressed 
by an occupant of the role are not clearly defined.
They range from an expectation of dying bravely to one 
of sensing the futility of life. Furthermore, all 
components of dying are both subject "to choice and
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constrained by circumstance, by social organization, and 
by other human beings" (Lofland, 1978: 57). Organizations 
and institutions can encourage role exits, relatives can 
disapprove of a dying style and the dying can be confined 
to hospitals and nursing homes.
Glaser and Strauss (1965) studied interactants 
in American hospitals. Probing the question of "whether 
people can die socially before they die biologically" 
researchers interpreted their observations of terminally 
ill patients, relatives and staff members, organized 
around an "awareness context" of the situation. They 
focused upon the possible combinations in awareness of 
a patient's fate for all interactants and observed 
behavioral tactics employed by participants that influenc-e 
changes occurring in the interaction. Closed awareness, 
suspected awareness, mutual pretense and open awareness 
represent a typology of situational context. Each type 
prescribes how individuals will define and redefine 
themselves as well as their relationship to one another 
during the dying process.
A closed awareness context, in which the patient 
is not informed or is not aware of a diagnosis of 
impending death, is often chosen by hospital staff. 
Pragmatic reasons for this preference include the preven­
tion of hysterical responses from patients and families 
in order to maintain social order. The imprecision in
18
predicting the exact timing of death is a useful rational­
ization to continue the charade. Reassigning emotionally 
attached nurses to other wards, subjecting, the patient to 
additional and perhaps unnecessary tests to induce a 
sense of optimism, maintaining a present-oriented 
conversation, and emphasizing to the patient the staff's 
confidence in medical knowledge and technology are some 
of the tactics that are informally learned and used for 
managing the situation. Because suspicious patients and 
relatives are sensitive to cues of terminality, the 
closed awareness context is unstable and usually breaks 
down quickly.
The suspected awareness context, in which the 
patient has a suspicion that the hospital personnel 
believes him to be dying, is described as a "contest for 
interactional control" (Glaser and Strauss, 1965: 47).
The patient's task is to detect or elicit signs of ter­
minality and the medical staff's task is to avoid dis­
closing a diagnosis. Responses to indirect queries can 
be interpreted by patients as "cues" signaling upcoming 
death. The context of mutual pretense refers to the 
situation in which both the staff and the patient 
recognize imminent death, but agree to maintain the 
charade that an illness is not terminal (1965: 64). Both 
the staff and the patient use "props" as well as behaviors 
to maintain the awareness context. For example, the dying
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person can decorate his hospital room, carefully attend to 
dress and grooming and avoid discussing topics that are 
related to health and death. The staff uses the everyday 
hospital routine and the traditional hospital props to 
sustain the mutual pretense.
Couched in Hughes' conception of "dirty work"
(1958) Glaser and Strauss explain why the nurse, rather 
than the physician, is often assigned the task of 
informing the patient of his fate. The doctor’s superior 
status allows the delegation of this unpleasant duty to 
lower ranking staff members. Furthermore, when physicians 
fulfill their ethical obligations of disclosing a 
diagnosis, the use of technical language is common because 
it serves the purpose of allowing "gentle disclosure" as 
well as the function of permitting the doctor to maintain 
an emotional detachment or social distance necessary for 
his continuous encounters with death.
Through direct disclosure by the medical staff, 
the context shifts to one in which both the staff and the 
patient acknowledge imminent death through overt behaviors. 
In this open awareness context, a patient responds to his 
newly gained knowledge by either denying or accepting his 
death. Dimensions of the denial type response are 
variable. A patient can test the validity of information 
received by playing a "polarity game." That is, by 
"questioning a nurse about the most extreme
20
life-or-death implications of his illness, the patient 
forces her to give a normalizing answer, which usually 
locates him a,safe distance from death” (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1965: 133). Engaging in solely future oriented 
conversations, comparing symptoms to those of people who 
appear more seriously ill, and employing selective compre­
hension of information are other examples of commonly 
used denial tactics.
Persons who accept upcoming death may actively 
prepare for the event by settling social and financial 
affairs, attempting to live a "full life" before death, 
or by committing suicide; also, a person can passively 
assent to the forthcoming event. The response of calm 
resignation is preferred by nurses, because it "relieves 
them of the responsibility for cheering up the patient 
and also improves their own morale" (Glaser and Strauss, 
1965: 130).
The doctor must, to a certain degree, shift his 
attention away from the dying and toward those who benefit 
from his services. His specialized training includes the 
formal learning of skills necessary to save or preserve 
life; daily contact with the dying could encourage an 
awareness of futile efforts. Once he is convinced that 
activities directed toward healing or curing a patient are 
useless, the doctor’s problem "becomes one of spending 
his time legitimately, according to professional values"
21
CGlaser and Strauss, 1965: 180). Researchers observed 
that the mechanisms doctors employ to handle the dilemma 
of coping with the dying include sending the*patient,home 
for the balance of his life, extending special privileges 
such as granting furloughs from hospital confinement, or 
treating the case as medically interesting or clinically 
valuable. These tactics are used because through informal 
learning, physicians adopt a medical philosophy that 
"perhaps includes even the moral, social or economic 
philosophy of the various specialities" (Hughes, 1958:
118). This philosophy implicates relations of physicians 
to each other, to their patients, and to members of the 
lay public.
The Glaser and Strauss typology is useful for 
explaining how an individual’s definition of death emerges 
through interaction. Families, medical staff.and 
characteristics of the setting influence behavioral 
responses of the terminally ill. Because the analysis 
is limited to observations of interactants in a coercive 
social setting, it fails to present an understanding of 
how the terminally ill define death in other settings. 
Furthermore, by solely focusing upon overt behaviors, 
Glaser and Strauss do not consider the individual’s 
covert interpretations for the meaning of personal death.
Some hospital-based researchers find that dying 
is a process characterized by distinct stages. The
22
psychoanalytically oriented work by Kubler-Ross (1969) 
presents an example of a stage theory of dying. For two 
years, Kubler-Ross and hospital chaplains interviewed 200 
terminally ill, hospitalized patients. Most patients 
defined themselves as religious, and all experienced ample 
time to work through stages. Kubler-Ross found that the 
first stage, denial, was initially embraced by almost 
all patients in order to allow the pursuit of life’s 
activities, and only three individuals in the study 
maintained denial until death. Researchers found the 
most acute and expressive forms of denial among those 
whose terminal diagnosis arrived prematurely or abruptly. 
Denial, no matter what form it takes, is fragile. As it 
breaks down, it is often replaced by anger, characterized 
by rage, envy and resentment. The patient knows that 
his projects, and goals can’t be accomplished, that he will 
lose control over his activities and that he will be 
abandoned by many of his former role partners. Anger can 
be "irrational,” for example, a resentment for young 
people because they have long-range plans, or it can be 
"rational," for example, a rage expressed for being 
confined to a hospital bed (1969: 54-70).
Bargaining is the third stage and usually repre­
sents a deal with God for postponing death. Self-imposed 
"deadlines" usually result in broken promises. Patients 
often find another occasion for bargaining. The fourth
23
stage, depression, represents a sense of hopelessness and 
sensing the loss of objects. Reactive depression refers 
to acknowledging the loss of objects such as "being a 
woman," a job, or companionship. It is different in 
nature than preparatory depression, or the depression 
that takes into account impending loss. Preparatory 
depression is used as a mechanism to accept the loss of 
all loved objects (Kubler-Ross, 1969: 87).
Acceptance is the final stage of dying. Kubler- 
Ross contends enough time as well as professional help 
are necessary for the patient to work through previous 
stages and finally accept death. Acceptance is not a 
happy or joyous sensation, nor is it a form of resigna­
tion. It is a time of passivity, of wanting to be alone, 
of wanting silence rather than conversations with 
visitors. Interests in worldly events diminish and the 
accepting patient feels "peaceful" while waiting for 
death. Hope can be maintained throughout all the stages. 
Early in the dying trajectory, patients can hope for 
cures. Later, they can hope that suffering and death 
have meaning for either the self or for others.
The Kubler-Ross thesis is somewhat limited by 
its approach to understand responses to personal death.
A large component of both hope and the acceptance stage 
is religious conviction. Since all patients interviewed 
were either religious at the onset of illness or
24
discovered the comforts of religious beliefs once diag­
nosed terminal, the concerns and reactions of the non­
religious dying individual are not discussed. Since all 
patients were hospitalized, it is possible to suggest 
that medical practitioners and the hospital setting are 
determinants of death acceptance. Although Kubler-Ross 
acknowledges that patients can sometimes shift from one 
stage to another, the model suggests that the sequence 
of stages is relatively fixed. For example, a patient 
progresses from depression to acceptance. This sequence 
might be affected by the sequence of medical treatments. 
Once a patient perceives that pallative care represents 
the nature of his medical treatment, it symbolizes that 
others acknowledge and accept imminent death, thereby 
encouraging the patient's acceptance of his fate. The 
model might/ therefore, be applicable only to those dying 
in specialized settings and under specialized circum­
stances. Since the patient's reactions must also be 
shaped by the meanings of death and by its influences on 
surviving family or others who are intimately related, 
explanatory power of the Kubler-Ross model is further 
limited by its neglect of the more sociological process 
of dying. Empirical findings do indicate that between 
60% and 75% of Americans die in hospitals or nursing homes 
(Simpson, 1979: 17). In 1978, 48% of deaths were due to 
cardiovascular-renal diseases and 22.4% resulted from
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cancer (Chiappetta, 1979: 95). These two major causes 
can both account for prolonged illness. Thus, the Kubler- 
Ross model presents a limited understanding for the dying 
process of many individuals.
In summary, the abilities to reason and to 
symbolize allow the person to understand the meaning of 
the future and of personal death. Events causing wide­
spread death result in psychological damage that includes 
an identification with death itself. They also permit 
description of possible reactions to the threat of death. 
Anxiety, alienation, guilt, fear and concern for health 
are some dimensions of death-related responses.
Settings designed to manage the dying and cope 
with death have goals of maintaining social order; 
participants employ mechanisms to remain detached from 
death while ^providing services necessary to cure the ill 
and quiet the dying. The dying process continues to be 
extended in duration. Contemporarily, more persons enact 
dying roles and more individuals interact with the dying 
than was the case in earlier times. These factors 
suggest that attitudes and behavioral responses toward 
personal death and toward the deaths of others are 
influenced by experiences and interaction; they are 
affected by characteristics of the social setting and can 
reflect personality characteristics of the individual.
CHAPTER II 
CONCERN FOR PERSONAL DEATH
In order to focus upon the individual and to 
propose death related cognitions influence everyday 
behaviors and the self, it is necessary to demonstrate 
that certain characteristics of persons in the general 
population are related to concern for personal death. 
Robert Kastenbaum has researched the topic for over a 
decade and contends a "standard, easily identified 
response that can be classified unambiguously as fear of 
death has not yet been established" (1974). Fear of death 
takes many forms and researchers assume that it is 
related to many concerns. Denial of mortality, occupa­
tional choices, risk-taking behavior and phobic 
behaviors are some of the responses studied. Thoughts 
concerning nonexistence, the process of dying, pain, 
dependency and the mode of death are among the several 
negative responses expressed. Although death related 
cognitions and behaviors are complex, examining the 
construction of paper-and-pencil measures and empirical 
findings based on these and other projective Instruments 
enables a definition of a population that is concerned 
with the prospects of death. Representatives from this
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population are distinguishable from those who are not 
overly concerned with their mortal nature.
For the purposes of this project, one who con­
sciously or nonconsciously responds to his own eventual 
death and evaluates inevitable fate negatively is defined 
as an individual who is concerned with death. This 
definition allows a discussion of findings that assess 
anxiety or tension that can motivate behavior and promotes 
an assessment of various degrees of death concern. 
Speculative or intuitive efforts to identify attitudes or 
behaviors that are not direct indicators of death concern 
do not meet the criteria imposed by the definition and 
are excluded from the compilation.
Sellitz et al. contend that in addition to its 
reliability and validity, a measuring Instrument must 
have the ability to make "distinctions fine enough for 
the purpose it is to serve” (1962: 148). Results from 
administering a test should also enable an assessment 
of the degree to which respondents differ on a certain 
characteristic. Three instruments designed to measure 
death concern are particularly valuable because various 
indices of validity and reliability have been determined. 
These produce findings that identify those overly 
concerned with personal death, compared to others. 
Furthermore, researchers using these instruments suggest 
that the three measures examine the same construct.
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Boyar's Fear of Death Scale consists of true-false state­
ments. Templer's Death Anxiety Scale'*' contains fifteen
2true-false items and Dickstein's Death Concern Scale con­
tains thirty items, each with four response alternatives.
From preliminary interviews, Boyar (1964) derived 
statements concerned with the act of dying, death's 
finality, corpses and burial practices. Judges rated 
items for face validity. Fear of death statements were 
embedded in filler items. Split-half, item-item- and 
item-test correlations were calculated. An experimental 
design was used to test the scale's empirical validity.
The Fear of Death Scale (FODS) was administered before 
and after a movie showing fatal traffic accidents that 
presumably increases death anxiety for an experimental 
group, and after a presumably innocuous movie showing 
traffic congestion for a matched control sample.
Increases in FODS scores for the experimental group 
allowed Boyar to conclude that his scale is an empirically 
valid measure of death fear. He used no procedures to 
assess construct validity, but construct validity of 
this measure is explored by Templer.
Templer (1970) tried to reflect broad life
^See appendix "A" for items of the Death Anxiety
Scale.
2
See appendix "B" for items of the Death Concern
Scale.
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experiences when composing the initial forty items for the
3Death Anxiety Scale (DAS). A clinical psychologist,
graduate students and chaplains rated the'statementsf
face validity on a five-point relevance scale. Thirty-one 
items were retained and embedded in 200 Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) items. Templer 
proposed that high death concern is not a variable that 
predicts specific, measurable, related phenomena, yet 
theoretically it is associated with emotional response, 
and a moderate degree of anxiety within the general 
population. Two separate projects were undertaken to 
assess construct validity, based on these assumptions.
The first involved administration of the DAS to 
21 institutionalized psychiatric patients whose clinical 
records reported high death anxiety and to a control 
group of institutionalized subjects, matched for 
diagnosis, sex and age. High death anxiety subjects 
had a mean DAS score of 11.62 and control subjects' mean
3
Internal consistency of the Templer scale was 
determined by administering the instrument to three 
groups; two were undergraduates and a third ranged in 
age from 25 to 57. Fifteen statements that had point 
biserial coefficients significant at the 0.10 level in 
two out of three analyses were retained. To insure 
lack of redundancy, phi coefficients were computed.
A product-moment correlation coefficient of 0.83 
between two administrations of the DAS to one group 
was obtained. In addition to test-retest reliability, 
the author reports reasonable internal consistency of 
a homogeneous test; the Kuder-Richardson formula 20 
produced a coefficient of 0.76.
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score was 6.77. Difference between the means was signifi­
cant at the 0.01 level. In the second project, the DAS, 
Boyar's FODS, a word association test and the MMPI were 
administered to 77 undergraduates following a pilot study 
that showed significant relationships between the use of 
emotional words in word association tests and DAS scores. 
The MMPI was included to identify associations between 
death concern and personality traits and to judge 
discriminant validity of DAS items. Intercorrelations 
among DAS scores and the three anxiety measures within 
the MMPI would suggest Templer's test identifies general 
anxiety rather than specific death anxiety. Reported 
high correlations between the DAS and Boyar’s FODS 
invite the conclusion that both scales are valid instru­
ments , and that neither is unique or superior to the 
other. Strong, positive correlations between the DAS 
and word association tests suggest projective techniques 
can measure death anxiety. Low to moderate relation­
ships among DAS and the three anxiety measures within 
the MMPI support the contentions that DAS is a valid 
instrument and that individuals in a general population 
can experience death anxiety. Death anxiety is not 
necessarily a manifestation of general anxiety, nor a
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certain syndrome of psychopathology.^
Dickstein (1972) composed 48 initial items, based 
on findings from previous research, to measure "conscious 
contemplation of the reality of death and negative 
evaluation of that reality." His scale is specifically 
designed to measure different degrees of death concern.
The initial 48-item questionnaire was administered to 
93 male and 67 female undergraduates.
Dickstein approached the task of determining 
construct validity in a manner markedly different than 
Templer. Dickstein contends that death concern scores 
should be positively related to scores on general 
anxiety because "the person who is consciously concerned 
about death should be more anxious generally than the 
person who avoids thoughts of death." Additionally, he 
hypothesized that those concerned with death are sensitive
’Thirty-two patients from an admissions ward of 
a psychiatric hospital were given the same battery of 
tests. DAS scores correlated positively with general 
anxiety and other types of psychopathology in this sample, 
suggesting schizophrenics, obsessive-compulsives and 
depressed persons experience high levels of death 
anxiety.
^Item analysis of the Dickstein DCS included 
examination of tests with the highest and lowest 27% 
of scores to eliminate 18 poor discriminators. The 
resulting 30-item scale and the Manifest Anxiety Scale 
were given to a group of students to determine internal 
consistency; measures were 0.85 and above. Two adminis­
trations of the DCS to female undergraduates from a 
different college produced a test-retest reliability 
correlation of 0.87.
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to, and avoid threatening stimuli. They should also 
believe events that affect the individual are not subject 
to internal control. To examine these relationships, a 
battery of tests was given to female undergraduates.
The possible range of DCS scores is 30-120. The 
ranges, means and standard deviations are similar for all 
administrations of the DCS; the distribution of scores 
from all tests is approximately normal. Test results 
indicate a significant, but moderate relationship between 
conscious death concern and anxiety^ and between death 
concern and sensitization to threatening stimuli. 
Respondents with high scores on anxiety measures scored 
85 or higher on the DCS while those low in anxiety 
scored 65 or lower on the DCS. Differences between the 
means of high, moderate and low DCS subjects are signifi­
cant at the 0.01 level.
Klug and Boss (1977) administered the DCS to one 
group of church-attending Roman Catholics (n=15 7) and 
Templer’s DAS with eight ’’Acceptance of Death” items
The Manifest Anxiety Scale, the State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory, the Repression-Sensitization Scale, 
the Internal-External Scale and the Edwards Personal 
Preference Schedule were administered with the DCS to 
volunteers. The personality schedule was used to 
determine relationships between death concern and 
differentiating personality characteristics.
^These findings are similar to Templer’s findings.
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constructed by Klug to another group from the same church 
(n=161). One purpose was to examine possible multi- 
dimensionality of the Dickstein construct; another was to 
test the validity of the instrument. Judges identified 
a ’’conscious contemplation” factor and a ’’negative 
evaluation” factor within the items. The two sets of 
data from the research project were factor analyzed, 
using a principal factor solution. Results suggest that 
the DCS is not measuring a unidimensional construct. 
Correlations computed on scores from both samples 
indicate a high degree of relationship between the 
negative evaluation component of the scale and Templer's 
DAS. The conscious contemplation component was similarly 
related to DAS items, but was not related to the eight 
Acceptance of Death items; These authors conclude that 
"the nature of conscious contemplation is not clear,” 
and that the Templer DAS and Dickstein DCS are valid 
measures of the same, but complex concern for death.
Researchers continue to assess the validity of 
these and other death concern scales. Durlak (1972) 
administered four measures to 47 male and 47 female 
undergraduates with the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability 
Scale (1960). Boyar's FODS, Sarnoff and Corwin's Fear
o
See appendix ”C" for the Acceptance of Death
items.
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of Death scale (1959), Lester's Attitudes Toward Death 
scale (1967), and the Lester-Collett Fear of Death and 
Dying Scale (1969) were presented in random order. 
Participants were told to complete questionnaires in the 
order of presentation. Correlations among death concern 
scales were moderate but significant; no general associa­
tions were found between any scale and social desirability 
indicators. Although higher intercorrelations among 
scales would account for more variance, Durlak concludes 
that each "lends support to the concurrent validity of 
the death measures." Moreover, he finds that responses 
to these tested items indicate attitudes toward personal 
death and dying rather than generalized fears of death.
In summary, it appears that researchers have 
constructed valid and reliable instruments that are 
capable of identifying various degrees of death concern. 
Some researchers use one or more of these scales when 
determining death concern and its possible antecedents 
or consequences among various populations. Others use 
projective techniques based on the assumption that an 
individual does not always say what is experienced when 
considering personal death. This argument fits the 
observed methodological constraints of the questionnaire 
format: "not only may people be reluctant to report
openly their beliefs, feelings, motivations, plans and 
so on; they may be unable to do so . self-report
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frequently requires self diagnosis" (Sellitiz et al.,
1962: 237). Since death concern can operate at a con­
scious, imagery or nonconscious level of awareness find­
ings derived from several methodological designs must 
be considered. Even a limited review of literature 
demonstrates that a considerable number of variables 
that relate to perceptions of finitude are examined 
through empirical research. For the purposes of this 
study, a limited presentation of research that examines 
(a)--personality or personal characteristics of the 
individual, (b) demographic variables, and (c) particular 
roles enacted by the individual is utilized.
Thorson (1977) investigated the relationship 
between personality characteristics and death fears. He 
gave the Boyar Scale and the Edwards Personal Preference 
Schedule (EP.PS) to 200 undergraduate and graduate 
students. He found that females scored higher than 
males on the FODS. Low scores were related to high 
aggression and endurance scores. Although his findings 
are also limited to students, Dickstein (1972) offers 
intriguing interpretations for associations among DCS 
scores and three personality traits measured by the 
EPPS. Death concern was correlated with hetero­
sexuality, succorance and change. Succorance scores 
were virtually identical for high and medium DCS 
subjects while the low DCS subjects had markedly lower
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succorance scores. Heterosexuality and resistance to 
change scores were similar for low and medium death 
concern subjects and different for high death concern 
subjects. The author posits "if the middle group is 
regarded as a normative group, it appears that the high 
death concern group is the discrepant group with regard to 
heterosexuality and change while the low death concern 
group is discrepant with regard to succorance."
Succorance is defined as a desire to have others provide 
help when in trouble, to seek encouragement and to seek 
sympathy. Dickstein suggests that low death concern 
individuals are "reluctant to acknowledge any failing 
on self-sufficiency."
Heterosexuality is defined as' endorsement of 
sexual pleasures. Dickstein’s data that relate high 
DCS scores to high heterosexuality scores support 
earlier findings. Greenberger (1965) used Thematic 
Apperception Test materials and reports a higher 
frequency of story completions reflecting illicit 
sexual encounters among terminally ill adult females 
compared to control group subjects. Sarnoff and 
Corwin (1959) found sexual arousal among some males 
induced a temporary death anxiety. Paris and Goodstein 
(1966) report females experience a higher level of 
sexual arousal than males after reading death related 
materials.
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Dickstein’s finding that high DCS subjects tend to 
avoid novelty and experimentation, i.e., they resist 
change, is interpreted as a ’’defense against the passage 
of time leading to inevitable death.” Dickstein and 
Blatt's earlier research (1966) supports this contention. 
High death concern among healthy young males was related 
to a foreshortened time perspective. Those preoccupied 
with death live more in the "present” and value the 
present compared to the "future." Feifel and Jones (1968) 
explored the same issue in their study comparing healthy, 
seriously ill, mentally ill and terminally ill older 
adults. Although the majority of subjects valued "time,” 
a large proportion of the seriously and terminally ill 
defined time as meaningless.
Perceptions concerning locus of control is 
another personality characteristic examined in relation 
to death concern. Dickstein (1972) found no relationship 
between DCS scores and scores from the Rotter Internal- 
External Scale (I-E) among female students. This finding 
contradicts findings from earlier research by Tolor and 
Reznycoff (1967) who used a different death anxiety 
scale and found a strong association between death 
concern and perceptions of external control among male 
students. Patton and Freitag (1977) administered a 
death concern instrument, the I-E scale and a measure 
of general anxiety to a student sample of 111 males and
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116 females ranging in age from 17 to 47. The Rotter 
Scale (1966) is based on social learning principles and 
hypothesizes behaviors are strengthened or weakened 
depending upon the individual's perceptions of his ability 
to cause desired behavioral outcomes. Patton and Freitag 
reasoned that those with an external locus of control 
feel helpless and unable to influence personal destiny. 
"Man's reaction to death points out how inadequate his 
coping mechanisms are in helping him deal with fear of 
death." Therefore, those scoring high on externality 
should score high on death anxiety. I-E scores among 
these subjects were inversely correlated with age; the 
older subjects were more likely to have an internal locus 
of control. I-E scores were moderately but significantly 
related to death anxiety, thereby supporting the 
research hypothesis. Those with an external locus of 
control showed higher death anxiety and were more anxious 
in general.
Tolor (1978) used the Health Locus of Control 
Scale (Wallston et al., 1976) that intends to measure 
a specific area of external control, an inventory of 
personal illness and accident, and a death concern measure 
in his study of white adults.. Eighty-six men and women 
from diverse occupational and educational backgrounds 
volunteered for the project. Mean ages were 34.2 for 
men and 38.5 for women. Males reported a greater
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frequency and seriousness of accident and illness but 
these data do not correlate with health locus of control 
scores. Women scored significantly higher than men on 
death anxiety but no relationships were found between 
locus of control and death concern within the research 
s amp1e .
Nehrke et al. (1977-78) were interested in how
different living arrangements affect the elderly’s 
attitudes toward death. They administered the Boyar FODS, 
the Templer DAS, a Life Satisfaction Index and the I-E 
scale to 120 adults, all over the age of 60. An equal 
number of participants lived in private nursing homes, 
in public housing units and independently in the commu­
nity. Findings show that the community sample was most 
satisfied with life, was almost internally ■ controlled 
and scored highest on death anxiety. Those in nursing 
homes scored lowest on life satisfaction, highest on 
externality and lowest on death anxiety. The authors 
suggest that a sharing of thoughts about death among 
nursing home residents might ameliorate death concern; 
no similar opportunity to work through anxiety exists 
for those who live independently.
Research on locus of control and death concern 
presents contradictory findings and interpretations.
This is a pervasive problem of dying and death literature 
that is partially explained by the populations studied,
40
by different conceptualizations of a construct, by the 
use of different instruments and by the lack of controls 
for variables that affect relationships .. Rather than 
conclude that empirical evidence negates a possible 
linkage between perceptions of externality and death 
concern, analysts must recognize age, sex, place of 
residence and other variables influence self-perceptions 
that, in turn, affect death related cognitions.
Sadowski et al. (1979-80) attempt to unravel the 
nonconclusiveness resulting from locus of control 
research. Based on earlier findings questioning the 
unidimensionality of Rotter's construct, they administered 
the Reid-Ware Three Factor Locus of Control Scale (Reid 
and Ware, 19 73) and Templer's DAS to 164 males and 211 
females. The Reid-Ware scale contains 45 items in a 
forced-choice format and measures Fatalism, Self-Control 
and Social System Control. Analysis of all responses 
shows that women score significantly higher on the DAS 
compared to men. Analysis of male responses via a 
multiple regression model shows that 337, of the variance 
in death anxiety is explained by age, and the Fatalism 
and Self-Control factors of the Reid-Ware measure. No 
significant relationship was found between the Social 
System Control factor and the male DAS scores. The same 
amount of variance in DAS scores for females was 
explained. However, age was not a determinant of death
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concern. Only the Social System Control and Self-Control 
factors account for variance in death anxiety among 
women.
The authors suggest that their findings reflect 
traditional sex role distinctions. The Social System 
Control factor measures a belief that powerful others 
influence one’s behaviors; the "feminine role has 
traditionally implied accepting a subordinate social 
position." The Fatalism factor measures a belief that 
luck or fate controls behavior and is congruent with "the 
traditional masculine role of . being able to cope
with an adverse and abstract environment." The Self- 
Control factor measures the extent to which the person 
believes behavior is determined by immediate impulses. 
Because it is a predictor of death concern for both sexes, 
Sadowski et al. conclude that death anxiety reflects 
concern over "inability to determine one’s own behavior 
rather than beliefs about whether or not events in the 
environment occur as a consequence of one's behavior."
A limited amount of research on the relationship 
between self-esteem and death concern has been attempted. 
Davis et al. (1978) replicated a study by Moses (1973)
that found an inverse relationship between self-esteem 
and death anxiety among college students. Templer’s 
DAS and the Texas Social Behavior Inventory were given 
to 383 undergraduates (36 black males, 56 black females,
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129 white males and 162 white females). Analyses of data 
indicate that males and blacks scored significantly 
higher on self-esteem than females and whites. A signifi­
cant interaction between race and sex was found; black 
males scored higher compared to all other groups. Female 
DAS scores were higher than male scores, but no signifi­
cant differences were found among other groups. The 
four sets of data were divided into subgroups of high 
and low self-esteem scores. Low self-esteem respondents 
(mostly white females) had significantly higher death 
anxiety scores than others. Black males manifest the 
least death anxiety. The authors compared mean DAS 
scores with those reported by Templer and Ruff (1971) 
on various populations and found that only psychiatric 
patients scored higher than white females with low self­
esteem scores. They conclude that "the cause of this 
high death anxiety . is not readily apparent but
suggests that additional research with such a group is 
warranted."
Some researchers probe the question of whether 
or not an individual's occupation affects or is influenced 
by death concern. After observing physicians who confront 
a daily threat of death, Hughes wrote "the layman has to 
learn to live with the uncertainty if not of ignorance, 
at least of lack of technical knowledge the physi­
cian has to live with and act in spite of the more closely
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calculated uncertainty that comes with knowing the limits 
of medical knowledge and his own skills" (Hughes, 1958: 
120). Feifel et al. (1967) found that ...a sample .of
physicians displayed higher death anxiety than a control 
•group. They reasoned that occupational choice might be 
affected by a need to master a disproportionately high 
fear of death. Ford et al. (1971) administered the
Collett-Lester and Lester death attitude measures to a 
group of Buffalo police and to a group of mailmen.
Police, like physicians, choose an occupation that cannot 
avoid the deaths of others. Moreover, police work 
involves an acknowledged threat of personal death 
(Rubinstein, 1973). Police and mail carriers did not 
differ on death fears. The only significant difference 
between groups was that more mailmen refused to take the 
test compared to police. Since police death anxiety 
scores were similar to college student scores, researchers 
conclude "by being patrolmen they may have worked through 
their death anxiety” (Ford et al., 1971: 502).
Koob and Davis (1977) investigated death concern 
among military officers and their wives. The research 
hypothesis, "a lengthy commitment to a high-risk 
occupation and the necessary time to work through death 
anxieties will result in scores for military officers 
that are similar to those of nonrisk subjects" was 
confirmed. Templer’s DAS was given to 72 active duty
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officers and their wives. Women scored significantly 
higher than men and spouses' scores were moderately but 
significantly related.
Rather than focus upon specific occupations, 
Diggory and Rothman (1961) propose a role perspective of 
death concern, resulting from research on students and 
older adults. The authors review literature that shows 
"other things are more feared than [one's own] death." 
Idleness, being alone, pain, the death of a significant 
other and cancer are commonly expressed fears. Also, 
some individuals choose death rather than endure its 
alternatives. Diggory and Rothman attempt to comprehend 
the nature of death fears by testing the proposition:
"to the extent that the goals a person values highly 
depend on his social status, his fear of various 
consequences of his own death should vary with his 
status or role, whether defined by age, sex, social 
class, religion or marital condition." Participants 
(n=563) rank ordered a list of seven consequences of 
death. No systematic sampling procedures were used 
but respondents were classified by age, sex, marital 
status, religious affiliation and a crude measure of 
social class based on education and family income.
^See appendix "D" for items of the Consequences 
of One's Own Death instrument.
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Frequency distribution tables were constructed showing the 
number of respondents who assigned a given rank to 
particular,items. Findings indicate that women fear 
dissolution of the body significantly more than men. 
Married persons rank inability to care for dependents 
a critical result of death while single or career oriented 
persons are more likely to be concerned with the termina­
tion of experience and the inability to complete projects. 
The researchers contend that "actively getting experi­
ences and executing plans are values the loss of which 
by death would be keenly felt because of their importance
. t r ,,10to self-esteem.
Empirical studies often report higher death 
anxiety among women compared to men (Middleton, 1936; 
Dickstein, 1972; Thomson, 1977; Koob and Davis, 1977). 
Analysts do not always interpret this finding. Some 
note that females score lower on self-esteem (Davis et al., 
1978), others allude that sex roles might influence the 
degree or nature of death concern (Diggory and Rothman, 
1961), while some explicitly contend that sex roles 
determine death anxiety (Sadowski et al., 1979-80).
McDonald (1976) suggests that death fears are learned
Diggory and Rothman conceptualize "self-esteem" 
differently than Davis et al. who found an inverse 
relationship between self-esteem and death anxiety scores. 
Findings from these two studies are not necessarily 
contradictory.
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responses. His research found females scored higher than 
males on the Templer DAS and he concludes "the signifi­
cance of sex differences and death anxiety is consistent 
with previous research. The indication that females 
have a propensity toward higher levels of death anxiety 
than males could be explained generally as a function 
of the differential socialization of males and females 
in our society."
Rheingold (1967) discusses how motherhood affects 
death fears, based on psychoanalytic case studies. He 
posits that the symbiosis of child rearing provokes 
generally intense perceptions of death among women, 
perceptions that vary with age. Kimball's (1971) 
interpretations of responses toward death consider the 
interaction of age with sex and are partly based on 
observations and interviews with male and female 
patients, who at various ages faced threatening or 
terminal illness. He finds that women in their early 
thirties experience the highest degree of death concern. 
"Her success in these years seems to be how much she is 
able to accept her lost youth and simultaneously 
separate herself from her children." He concludes that 
some anxieties can result from dependencies and an 
identity based on a procreative role. Others can result 
from social expectations for females.
Since sex differences seem to be the most
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conclusive findings of death concern research, controlling 
for gender enables exploration of the many contradictions 
found when studying specific populations or relationships 
between death fear and other factors. One area of non- 
conclusive research is the affect of religion on death 
attitudes o Generally-, researchers study homogeneous 
populations, consider isolated aspects of the multi­
dimensional concept of "religion" and neglect to impose 
controls for variables capable of determining relation­
ships .
Religious affiliation is one variable that has 
been examined. Martin and Wrightsman (1965) examined 
death attitudes among members from three different 
churches and found no significant ■ differences. Vernon 
(19 70) surveyed college students throughout the United 
States and found some differences in death attitudes 
based on religious affiliation. Mormons feared death 
less than other groups, while Jews reported religious 
beliefs increase death anxiety. Jepson (1967) studied 
high school students and adult evening school students 
to examine Protestant-Catholic differences in attitudes.
In this sample, he found that more Catholics define death 
in negative terms and more Catholics said they fear 
death.
Other researchers try to determine relationships 
between religious commitment or degree of religiosity
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and death anxiety. Swenson’s research (1959) had the 
purpose of obtaining an objective measure of death atti­
tudes among the aged. Three categories of attitudes-- 
positive or forward looking, evasive, and fearful--emerged 
from essays written on the topic of personal death. The 
resulting checklist of attitudes was administered to 
200 individuals from nursing homes, golden-age clubs and 
business organizations. Participation in religiously 
oriented activities was used to define religiosity. Those 
who reported frequent religious activities were likely 
to express positive or forward looking attitudes toward 
death. Nonreligious individuals were more likely to 
express evasive or fearful attitudes.
-In an early study, Feifel (1959) defined 
religious individuals as those who believe in God, in a 
"divine purppse" for the universe, in life after death, 
and in the bible as the revealer of "God’s truth."
Others were defined as nonreligious. The research 
sample consisted of 50 young people, 40 elderly indivi­
duals, 35 professionals and 85 mentally ill individuals. 
Feifel reports religious subjects were more fearful of 
death and that death fears increase with age. Pveligious 
people said that they were aware of death at an earlier 
age and had a more negative -orientation to the later 
years of life, compared to nonreligious respondents.
In a later study, Feifel (1973) included a
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measure of religious creed, a religious self-rating and a 
measure of religious behavior to distinguish between 
religious and nonreligious individuals. To assess death 
anxiety, instruments measuring conscious, imagery and 
nonconscious awareness of death concern were used.
Subjects were 95 healthy and 92 terminally ill persons, 
ranging in age from 10 to 89 (M=40). No significant 
differences were found between religious and nonreligious 
subjects when measuring the three levels of death concern. 
The only difference found was that at a nonconscious 
level, the terminally ill expressed more anxiety toward 
death. Feifel concludes "the characteristic set for 
most subjects is a kind of coexisting acceptance- 
avoidance equilibrium toward fear of death” that is 
not influenced by religiosity.
Chasin (1971) controlled for sex, education, 
family income and size of home town when analyzing 
responses from 324 questionnaires received from church 
members of one area in Iowa. A measure of religious 
orthodoxy constructed by Browne and Lowe (1951) and the 
Swenson checklist to measure death concern were used. 
Chasin finds that "women may be more homogeneous in 
their conceptions of death than are men." Most females, 
regardless of religiosity, conceptualize death as 
"sadness0" Male fundamentalists are more likely to see 
death as "peaceful bliss" compared to less orthodox
males. When controlling for income or education, reli­
gious orthodoxy is related to evasive attitudes toward 
death among men.;. Males with higher incomes or higher 
education are less evasive than those with lower incomes 
or less years of formal education. Considering the 
importance of controlling for key variables when 
looking for attitude linkages, Chasin asks "what is it 
in the lives of women . which causes them to
look at death in ways which are not affected by religious 
beliefs?"
La Piere and Farnsworth (1949) posit an associa­
tion between age and death attitudes. They contend that 
a lack of indoctrination into a system of beliefs for 
the elderly is one reason for a reluctance to accept 
old age„ Being "old" is viewed simply as a preface to 
death for many, and no adequate preparation exists for 
assuming an aged role. Consequently, the elderly 
should be anxious concerning upcoming death. Although 
empirical studies produce conclusive evidence for the 
relationship between age and death anxiety, it is not 
in the direction predicted by La Piere and Farnsworth. 
Martin and Wrightsman (1965) found older church-going 
respondents expressed less fear of death than younger 
individuals. Similarly, Swenson (1959) reported about 
half of his elderly subjects expressed positive atti­
tudes toward death; some in poor health looked forward to
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death. Riley's (1970) interviews with 1,482 adults from 
urban households show that age is one of the best predic­
tors of death awareness and death attitudes. Older, 
compared to younger, respondents plan for death and 
discuss death with friends. They are not likely to 
express fears about death or dying.
To test the hypothesis that an individual's 
awareness of time remaining in his life is an inverse 
function of age, fifty healthy, retired individuals 
were asked four questions concerning time perspectives 
(Marshall, 1975). Researchers found that awareness of 
impending death was strongly related to age; older 
respondents expected to die in the near future. Moreover, 
awareness was related to whether or not the respondent 
had outlived his parents, siblings or friends. Younger 
individuals who had outlived their parents were most 
aware of limited time. Researchers explain why age is 
not the key determinant of death awareness. Experiencing 
the deaths of others and comparing self to others appear 
to initiate awareness of the upcoming event.
Nehrke (1974) administered the Boyar FODS and a 
21-item semantic differential rating of self-concept to 
25 three-generational female family units in order to 
assess actual and perceived death anxiety. Subjects 
completed measures in regard to self (actual) and in 
regard to perceived attitudes- of the other two female
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members. Findings indicate that each generation rated 
self lowest in death anxiety. Grandmothers accurately 
predicted higher death anxiety for their daughters and 
granddaughters. The youngest generation significantly 
misperceived the older generations as being more anxious 
concerning personal death. Nehrke concludes that a 
grandmother can accurately predict death anxiety of 
others because she has experienced various degrees of 
it throughout her life, whereas the more anxious and 
younger generations "assume" the elderly fear death.
Generally, researchers use college students or 
the elderly for examining the relationship of death 
awareness or death anxiety to age. Children and 
adolescents have received limited attention. For 
example, Alexander and Adlerstein (1958) administered 
a word association test to individuals ranging in age 
from 5 to 16. They found that all age groups in the 
sample responded similarly to death words. As measured 
by galvanic skin responses and response time, death 
words evoked more intense reactions compared to basal 
words.
Few studies, other than broad surveys that avoid 
the nature or degree of death concern, attempt to 
identify the effects of age on death attitudes in a 
population ranging from childhood through the aged. 
Although adulthood represents a neglected area of
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exploration for those interested in the relationship 
between age and death anxiety in the general population, 
findings from specific populations do, however, allow 
inferences. Since the procreative role is related to 
high death anxiety, a large proportion of adult women 
should manifest high death anxiety. Since age is related 
to locus of control scores, and locus of control to death 
attitudes, younger compared to older adults should 
express more concern for personal death. If socializa­
tion practices and sex roles explain learned death 
fears, an interaction among age, sex and sex role 
expectations might predict high death anxiety exists for 
younger adult, women.
A limited review of studies, that_in most cases 
treat death anxiety as a dependent variable, suggest a 
summary of characteristics for those who are overly 
concerned with death. Contrary to many researchers' 
intuitions, evidence suggests that the elderly are not 
overly concerned with upcoming death. Perhaps they have 
had ample time to consider death's finality or perhaps 
problems faced by the elderly outweigh concern for 
inevitable death. It can also be suggested that the 
elderly fear an unknown dying process more than they fear 
inevitable death. These thoughts are congruent with 
findings indicating those committed to risky occupations 
show only low to moderate death anxiety. Those facing
54
death obviously use whatever mechanisms are necessary to 
prevent the threat of death from interfering with life’s 
tasks, or they have accepted death as an integral part 
of life.
High death anxiety is found among some college 
aged and adult individuals. Heterosexuality, resistance 
to change, a "present time" orientation, low self-esteem 
and perceptions of an external locus of control are some 
indicators of a high degree of concern among college 
students.
Sex is a major predictor of high death anxiety 
for adults and college students. Overall, males are less 
concerned with death than are women. The observed inter­
actions between sex and self-esteem and between sex and 
locus of control factors suggest that females scoring 
low on self-esteem or high on externality are concerned 
with personal death. Introducing a procreative role for 
these females that includes a high degree of concern for 
life and death, based on the concepts of separation and 
loss, invites inference that low self-esteem or externally 
controlled mothers are individuals who manifest the 
highest possible degree of death anxiety. If "birth" and 
"death" are considered opposite ends on a continuum of 
something called "life," a biological-destiny argument 
might explain death anxiety among women, as well as the 
relationship found between endorsement of sexual
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pleasures (heterosexuality on the EPPS) and death concern 
among women. Although it is beyond the scope of this 
study to explore the question, analysis of the contents 
of sex roles might provide the most effective means for 
understanding the emergence of high death concern among 
women„
The preceding discussions focus upon death 
anxiety or death fears because most researchers dichoto­
mize responses— an individual either fears death or is 
unafraid of it; people either accept or deny finitude. 
Responses are either passionate or apathetic. These 
simplistic conceptualizations present a major problem 
for those attempting to understand the nature and degree 
of death concern. Because researchers can evoke 
contrived responses toward personal death when adminis­
tering paper-and-pencil tests, and can impose invalid 
inferences and interpretations on projective test 
findings (Sellitiz et al., 1962), the problems of 
understanding death related responses are compounded.
A few contributors suggest that most individuals 
acknowledge and react to thoughts about their own death. 
For example, Alexander et a l . (1957) studied death 
cognitions among male college students and concluded 
’’the concern with death would appear to be a force that 
has a continuing effect and is not confined . to
instances of childhood, old age and psychopathology."
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Within his sample, Feifel (1973) found subjects indicated 
little conscious concern for death. However, at the 
imagery level, the same subjects perceived death 
ambivalently. Death was described as "clean" and "gentle" 
but also as "dark" and "solitary»" A word association 
test showed that the same individuals reacted anxiously 
to death stimuli.
Diggory and Rothman (1961) posit that the nature 
of death concern is related to social roles. Although 
it escapes the attention of these researchers, their 
analysis suggests why enactment of several and possibly 
conflicting roles evokes paradoxical responses toward 
death. It also suggests that, researchers falsely 
dichotomize death attitudes.
In order to comprehend its nature, it appears 
that researchers must find some means to tap the 
meanings individuals assign to the consequences of 
personal death. Understanding contradiction and paradox 
is necessary. An isolated example of this type of 
approach is offered by Bakshis et al. (1974) who used a
Twenty Statements Test format to operationalize attitudes 
toward personal death. Seventy-nine nurses answered 
the question "what is death?" Through content analysis,
17 categories of responses were identified. Two judges 
coded responses; reliability indices ranged from 0.80 
to 0.96. One purpose of the research was to focus upon
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"the saliency and the complexity of the symbolic and 
social context in which death is perceived." Perhaps the 
most important finding is that death was perceived in a 
variety of ways by most respondents. The majority viewed 
death both favorably and unfavorably. Termination of 
social activities, relationships and conditions were 
often mentioned responses and these consequences were 
described in both negative and positive terms. Although 
a TST approach does not measure specific attitudes, it 
promotes an understanding of perceived consequences of 
death. If used in conjunction with other measures, it 
could ameliorate some of the conceptual problems of dying 
and death research that have been discussed within this 
study. Because contradictory definitions emerged from 
a, homogeneous population of white, married nurses and 
from individual respondents, Bakshis concludes that 
"one may surmise that these meanings are essentially 
a reflection of the actor’s experience, that they are 
situationally generated, and selectively expressed."
Although a compilation of empirical studies 
suggests some possible identifiable characteristics of 
the individual, the elusive and multidimensional meanings 
of death pose an unsolved dilemma for researchers and 
for those who attempt definitively to describe a 
conceptual population of persons concerned with death. 
However, research findings do allow conclusions that
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individuals respond to perceptions of death.
Contradictory responses, affected by the contents of 
enacted, or imagined social roles , are typical. One 
approach to understand the consequences of death for the 
person is to explore how and why the self, or an 
identity, emerges that defines the meanings of personal 
death.
CHAPTER III 
THE ROLE IDENTITY MODEL
Preceding discussions show that concern for death 
is related to personal and social characteristics of the 
person. Thus, a framework that considers these factors 
in its explanation of the self is necessary to explore 
how perceptions of death and the self are interrelated. 
McCall and Simmons describe a processual self that 
determines behavior and influences ongoing relationships 
based on enacted and idealized roles. In the Meadian 
tradition, they are interested in what goes on "inside” 
the person as well as in what goes on "between" people.
The authors label the approach to describe and explain 
who comes together to engage in what activities, where 
and how as "simply interactionist" (McCall and Simmons, 
1978: 10). The focus is upon the individual and his 
everyday behaviors; the model is theoretically developed 
by exploring how and why individuals interact.
Components of several perspectives (e.g., social exchange, 
reference group theory, structural role theory) are 
subsumed by this^ framework in order to augment the 
limited explanatory power of any particular theory of 
human behavior.
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G. H. Mead's "self" is treated as an intervening 
variable between antecedents of the social world and an 
actor's behaviors. Consequently, the image of man is 
dialectical. He is portrayed as "dwelling in two 
distinct 'worlds,' the physicalistic world of animals 
and the idealistic world of mind and culture." A person 
is considered a rational thinker, yet "many of the 
complex decisions with which we credit him should
not be interpreted as necessarily the results of deliber­
ate reasoning." Identities are acquired and altered 
through role partnerships; moreover, relationships 
"contain the seeds of their own destruction, they cause 
members to change, and changed members entail altered 
relationships." This image of the symbol using person 
who constructs and defines a reality that is "fragile 
and adjudicated--a thing to be debated, compromised and 
legislated" presents a unifying, symbolic interactionist 
theme to the role identity model that invites further 
exploration based on a dialectical perspective of social 
behavior.
Its authors contend that the framework is best 
suited to explain self and interaction among young and 
relatively independent persons who have the resources to 
seek rewards from various settings while recognizing 
opportunities are limited by man's finite nature. 
Delineating the processual nature of self and interaction
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is a critical goal of the role identity model. McCall and 
Simmons suggest that the intuitive charm of unilinear 
causation precludes investigation of the interdependence 
of variables in most social scientific efforts. Thus, 
to introduce their perspective, the concept of inter­
action is defined. "Whenever a relationship of determin­
istic influence between two events cannot be resolved 
into a simple function of one but must instead be treated 
as a j oint function, as a mutual or reciprocal influence, 
we have a case of interaction" (1978: 46). Through 
interaction, the planning, sometimes rational, individual 
assigns and interprets arbitrary but shared meanings to 
stimuli; resulting social objects enable appropriate 
plans of action to achieve desired goals. A person’s 
enduring and situationally specific selves are seminal 
social objects that implicate expressive and cognitive 
activities for all interactants.
McCall and Simmons posit that the person's 
conception of self is likely to be role specific. Rather 
than limit their analysis to structurally prescribed and 
conceptually static "social roles," they synthesize 
personal characteristics with social characteristics of 
the individual by using the concept "interactive role," 
a line of action that considers both conventional 
expectations and idiosyncratic perceptions of a position. 
Whereas interactive roles are expressively enacted, "role
identities” are cognitively enacted. The content of a 
role identity is an "imaginative view of [the person] as 
he likes to think of himself being,and acting as an 
occupant of [a specific] position" (1978: 65). A person 
has role identities for each status he assumes and for 
each he plans to occupy; identities may cluster, based 
on shared skills, audiences or institutional context. 
These idealized roles are somewhat determined by other 
persons; thus the content of role identities includes 
others, and is emergent since individuals have several 
interaction partners.
Role identities do not simply form a set of 
disunited parts„ Rather the parts "exist in relation to 
one another and . . the relationships may be those of
conflict as easily as those of compatibility" (1978: 74) 
Identities are woven into an interrelated whole, 
representing a somewhat stable idealized self, and into 
fluid situational selves. A prominence hierarchy define 
the holistic self. It is determined by the degree to 
which a person supports his own view of role identities, 
the degree to which identities receive support from 
significant others, and the commitment to, or investment 
in certain roles. It is therefore influenced by an 
interaction exchange of rewards. Rewards can be 
extrinsic, intrinsic, take the form of role support or 
be a combination of any forms. Intrinsic rewards, the
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gratification received from performance itself, is viewed 
as a link between "animal" and "idealistic" worlds of 
humans. Role support is defined as a "set of reactions 
and performances by others the expressive implications 
of which tend to confirm one's detailed and imaginative 
view of himself as an occupant of a position" (1978: 71). 
Since role support confirms the content of role identities, 
a reciprocal process of defining and interpreting each 
other’s performances is a mechanism for legitimating 
role identities. Audiences vary in their relevance for 
role support and a person's self is among his most 
important critics.
McCall and Simmons link the self to behavior by 
positing that role identities suggest plans of action.
An individual is continually motivated to legitimate 
idealized versions of self since discrepancies always 
exist between the content of role identities and support 
gained through interactive role performances. Obtaining 
intrinsic and extrinsic rewards through performances 
shifts the need state of the individual in readily 
predictable patterns. The rewards of role support, 
however, affect role identities differently. Receiving 
slightly more or slightly less than the desired amount 
increases the need for additional role support. Extreme 
discrepancies evoke different responses. Receiving 
significantly more than desired can increase an appetite
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for additional role support. Receiving extremely less 
than anticipated amounts discourages the individual from 
seeking further support for that specific identity 
(1978: 86 and 98).
A salience hierarchy of role identities represents 
the means for managing situational selves. It is the 
person's preferences for enacting a subset of interactive 
roles. A finite person realizes that each role repre­
sents a different line of action, that role identities 
are not equal in importance and that enactment opportuni­
ties are limited. Additionally, the performance of any 
given role is multiply relevant; it involves and affects 
numerous identities. An individual arranges a salience 
hierarchy to represent a relative order of priority of 
identities as possible sources of performance in a 
specific situation. This hierarchy is determined by the 
prominence of various role identities and by perceived 
opportunity structures. It is also determined by 
situationally specific needs.
Through interacting with others, a person seeks 
role identity support. "Undoubtedly man's most 
distinctive type of gratification is support for his 
various role identities" (1978: 148). Meanings attached 
to all social objects, including alter's responses, are 
created and defined through perceiving implications for 
cognitive and expressive activities. McCall and Simmons
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consider the premise that perceptions are arbitrary, 
incomplete and not always accurate. Past training and 
experiences, a person’s hierarchies of role identities, 
sensory limits, personal perspectives and selective 
attention are factors that influence the active process 
of directly perceiving role partners.
When interpreting a message from alter, ego 
recodes empirical information via abstracting and assign­
ing messages to symbolic categories. In order to 
identify potential role support opportunities, one actor 
can categorize another's social identity by stereotyping 
and can assess his personal identity through the indirect 
knowledge of his personal reputation. Although both 
types of impressions often contain bits of misinforma­
tion, they enable initial encounters. A person, compared 
to other social objects, has the unique ability to 
"purposefully and differentially conceal or reveal 
certain of its characteristics" in order to maintain 
control over the self being presented (1978: 115). Thus, 
the information exchanges between actors are continually 
calculated with the goals of obtaining role support and 
other rewards. Since unconscious gestures and attitudes 
affect "expressions given off" (Goffman, 1959: 2) and 
since alter imputes characteristics to ego that will 
benefit his line of action, expressive control of the 
self is never total.
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Socialization outcomes usually help the person 
understand the context of structured situations, thereby 
giving him cues to the meanings of alter’s behavior. In 
unstructured situations, those that are somewhat ambiguous 
and those that represent most encounters, alternative 
interpretations of events and identities are possible.
A working agreement, or mutual negotiation of identities 
in order to receive at least partial recognition for 
idealized roles, is necessary (McCall and Simmons, 1978: 
139). Cognitive and expressive processes explain how a 
working agreement emerges.
Role taking is a cognitive activity that allows 
the actor to perceive opportunity structures from which 
to gain support for salience hierarchy identities. The 
purpose of role taking is not to see a "true self” but 
to judge, through alter’s behaviors, his line of action 
that gives coherence, direction and meaning to his 
interactive role in a specific situation. Inferring 
identity is a mutual process between actors. Pvole 
taking ability is affected by the conventionality of 
settings and performances, by familiarity with alter 
and by subjective or objective experiences with similar 
roles. Finally, role taking is a metaphor. "When we 
’project' ourselves into [alter’s] situation and imagine 
how we would feel, we are sometimes impressed by the 
intensity and realism of our own feeling, but these
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feelings are ours, not his, and the accuracy of our role 
taking remains uncertain" (19 78: 131). In addition to 
role taking, an actor cognitively .improvises an inter­
active role, in terms of how alter's behaviors can be 
used as an opportunity to gain rewards.
Role taking and devising appropriate interactive 
roles are seminal components of interaction, yet they 
cannot be witnessed by others. The expressive processes 
of presentation of self and altercasting explain how 
actors overtly communicate perceptions. Goffman’s (1959) 
presentation, of self describes how actors control 
expressive behaviors in order to communicate the character 
assumed in a particular situation.. A skillful actor 
claims an identity that is difficult for others to deny.
He constrains alter to act in accordance with his inter­
active role. In a sense, presentation of self becomes 
a self-fulfilling image because alter's responses reflect 
ego’s performances of a certain character. Tactics used 
to present the optimal self are influenced by the 
audience and by personality characteristics of the actor 
(Weinstein and Beckhouse, 1969)„ Altercasting is 
analogous to presentation of self, in that one actor 
attempts to control the expressive behavior of another 
and the imputed role tends to be self-fulfilling. Its 
point of application, however, differs. Altercasting 
is the process whereby ego imputes to alter a particular
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role and acts toward him as if he were that particular 
character (Weinstein and Deutschberger, 1963).
All actors engage in cognitive and expressive 
processes of interaction, thereby producing a complex 
intertwining of social and personal identities among 
interactants. Factors such as status - differentiations 
and structural expectations constrain the individual's 
behaviors, yet McCall and Simmons posit that most 
circumstances allow for the negotiation of social 
identities. Both social and interactive roles are 
compromised by actors through bargaining. Negotiations 
of social identities are motivated by considerations of 
potential profit. Each change, or refusal to change, in 
both altercasting and presentation of self is acknowledged 
by expressive behaviors. Interactants seek support for 
role identities that are highest in the salience hierarchy 
and are thus willing to cede dimensions of self in order 
to reach perceived goals (Blumstein, 1975). When actors' 
identities in an encounter are reasonably negotiated, a 
"working agreement" exists that allows interaction to 
continue. Working agreements do not usually represent 
the goals of interaction, nor are they necessarily stable 
agreements. Actors continue to struggle over the 
character they wish to portray (McCall and Simmons,
1978: 139). However, the working agreement is a component 
of defining the situation and enables the beginning of
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interaction tasks that are aimed at achieving certain 
goals.
McCall and Simmons posit "our actions are tailored 
to convey, through expressive implications, hints of 
what we are willing to do, if only alter will accept 
certain detailed contents of our altercasting and 
presentation of self” (1978: 147). Weinstein and 
Deutschberger (1964) extend this analysis by focusing 
upon the function, rather than the content of activities. 
Actors bargain, adapting to goals and circumstances of 
specific encounters, so that the task response for ego 
becomes the line of action for alter. Negotiated social 
and personal identities enable the person to seek extrin­
sic and intrinsic rewards for role performances. More 
importantly, the person seeks support for role identities, 
or the self. ”Men seek to live and act in the manner in 
which they like to imagine themselves living and acting 
or, failing that in some degree, at least to be able to 
continue thinking of themselves in that same manner” 
(McCall and Simmons, 1978: 148). Individuals seek role 
identity support through the merits of performances, or 
more deviously through "outright bartering.” Usually, 
encounters involve a combination of tactics and have 
the purpose of achieving a mixture of rewards.
Identities must continually be legitimated because 
discrepancies always exist between idealized selves and
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role support received. "Woman's work is never done, nor 
is that of maintaining the self.” Sustained relation­
ships provide a somewhat routinized means for obtaining 
necessary role identity support. Relationships can be 
categorized by the basis for interaction, e.g., 
institutional, legal, McCall and Simmons posit that the 
nature of a relationship is based on reward dependability, 
ascription, commitment, investment, or attachment. Often, 
these factors blend together in relationships, yet they 
remain at least analytically distinct from one another. 
Individuals tend to become preoccupied with attachment 
as the basis for continued interaction but "the societies 
they live in are most concerned with their ascriptions 
and commitments" (1978: 171).
Ascription provides the individual with some of 
his first role identities. A child's sex, socioeconomic, 
religious and family roles form the basis for later 
identities. Cognitively learning social roles through 
anticipatory socialization, that is, "learning some­
thing of the shape and content of many roles that he 
will not be allowed really to perform for many years, 
if indeed ever," is a neutral process that can prepare 
a person for future roles as well as provide unrealistic 
expectations for the individual. For some roles, 
including a dying role, anticipatory socialization is 
impossible. A young person fantasizes enactment of
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future roles and thus begins to attach the ideal standards 
for roles that will become the content of role identities. 
First audiences are critical for the person’s decision 
to embrace or abandon certain identities; later experi­
ences teach him to accommodate to. a conventionalized 
world. Most importantly, idealisms do not easily dis­
appear. "Unfulfilled components of role identities have 
a way of being visited upon the heads of succeeding 
generations" (McCall and Simmons, 1978: 215).
Role identity hierarchies emerge once the person 
perceives rewards for interactive roles. As audiences 
and experiences become diverse, the clustering of 
identities begins. Unfitting roles are abandoned and 
those congruent with opportunities enter the hierarchy. 
Skills and role partners are factors that affect the 
process that continues throughout a person’s life.
Adults "outgrow" identities, but identities once 
legitimated are difficult to discard, "especially those 
associated with great vigor, athletic skill, beauty, 
occupational horizons, mobility and freedom."
Nonetheless, as audiences change, the self changes. A 
continual process of accommodation appears to represent 
the person’s self. Allocating resources, while 
considering the demands of relationships based on 
ascription and commitment is necessary. Since the 
person shapes, and is shaped by his opportunity structures,
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managing them is a seminal life task; logistical problems 
result from man’s human nature. "Although m a n ’s 
opportunities are thus limited, as by the laws of physics 
and physiology, his aspirations are not" (1978: 232).
Since the calculations of costs and rewards from rela­
tionships are subjective, and interpreting alter's 
behaviors is to a degree egocentric, misperceiving 
opportunity structures is common, or as McCall and 
Simmons write, "love is blind."
Scheduling time and investment for performances in 
order to maximize profits is managed through agenda 
construction.. Short term agendas are determined by the 
person's salience hierarchy, or situational selves. They 
represent preferred alters and .situations that encourage 
multiply relevant role enactment. Short term agendas 
are nested in long term agendas. The later are abstract 
plans or goals that indirectly influence activities.
The relationship between short and long term agendas is 
somewhat problematic, as each can disrupt the other.
"Prime encounters," those that involve high levels of 
emotional intensity, can upset commitment to short term 
agendas. Long term plans can be revised due to life 
crises or other extraordinary events. McCall and Simmons 
conclude their analysis by observing that the usual 
patterning of a person’s activities represents an 
accommodation to the limitations of the empirical world.
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But, "we are only partly bound by physical events and only 
tenuously bound to the present. Our symbolic proclivities 
allow us to people the empirical world.with characters, 
events, and objects that no positivist could hope to 
detect."
Propositions delineated by McCall and Simmons can 
be integrated with generalizations derived from dying 
and death studies in order to suggest reciprocal relation­
ships between death and the self. The following case 
s t u d y s h o w s  how acknowledging death influences the 
everyday behaviors for one person, and illustrates the 
interrelationships among hierarchies of role identities, 
agenda construction, perceptions of opportunities and 
means for accommodating to eventual death.
Richard and Jane are married to each other. They 
are both in their mid-30s and they both acknowledge that 
their maximum life span is approximately 50 years.
Richard endures a terminal kidney condition; one that 
isn’t popular and one that is not being researched. 
Physicians informed him of his terminal condition during 
the' seventh year of his marriage to Marie and during the 
last year of his graduate course work. Investment in 
academic roles and commitments to the marital relationship
■^This information was obtained through informal, 
unstructured interviews, conducted in the Fall of 1979.
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ceased. Role identity hierarchies seem to have been 
drastically rearranged. It was no longer possible to 
receive role identity support for a husband and future 
father role, since Marie decided that a terminal spouse 
who shouldn’t procreate wasn’t part of the marriage 
arrangement. Marriage with Marie ended and began with 
Jane. The costs of a several year competition for a 
respectable position teaching medieval literature no 
longer appeared to be balanced with its potential rewards. 
Thus, academia was put aside in order to seek employment 
with immediate income rewards.
In one sense, Richard accommodates to his terminal 
world. His plans concern a foreshortened future. His 
activities are directed toward receiving rewards from 
delimited opportunity structures, and he has ceded 
several dimensions of self that were, at another time, 
important. In another sense, he doesn't accommodate 
to the limiting world of others. For example, he isn't 
concerned with the economic status of the U.S. when his 
children mature, he doesn't plan to compete for profes­
sional opportunities, he spends money on unplanned, 
spontaneous vacations and adventures rather than saving 
for the future. He claims he is not restricted to living 
his life in the manner expected for most adults. He 
senses a large degree of freedom to select role partners 
and interaction settings. In summary, Richard's
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acknowledged mortal nature affects the content of role 
identities, the hierarchies of role identities, the 
encounters and relationships from which to gain rewards, 
and long term and short term agendas. Although his life 
is unusual in that he has a crystallized perception of 
when existence will end, some of his responses to 
finitude should be similar to those of individuals who are 
concerned with eventual death. Integrating role identity 
model propositions with dying and death literature is 
one way' to generalize how perceptions of death affect 
the self.
The major concepts used by McCall and Simmons to 
explain self and everyday behavior are role identities, 
interactive roles, hierarchies of role identities, 
negotiation of the self and opportunities for rewards. 
Several definitions and propositions of the role identity 
model are particularly useful for this study. The 
following components will be used to propose relationships 
between an observable self and perceptions of death.
1) The content of a role identity is an idealized
version of the person as an occupant of a specific posi­
tion. The person defines content, and it is shaped by
alter’s responses to role performances.
2) An interactive role is a synthesis of a 
socially prescribed role performance with a person’s 
idiosyncratic perceptions of a social position. Thus,
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the person constructs and devises interactive roles.
3) A prominence hierarchy of role identities 
defines the enduring, holistic self. A salience, hierarchy 
defines situational selves and represents preferences for 
interactive roles or subsets of roles in specific 
situations. Hierarchies can reflect conflicting arrange­
ments of identities; they are largely determined by
the rewards and costs of interaction.
4) The cognitive processes of role taking and 
improvising interactive roles, and the expressive proc­
esses of presentation of self and altercasting are means 
for reaching a working agreement of negotiated identities 
that enables pursuit of interaction tasks. Actors 
control each other’s behaviors and are constrained by 
each other’s behaviors.
5) Perceptions of opportunities, i.e., of 
rewarding interactions, are arbitrary, incomplete and 
not necessarily accurate. They are based on the person’s 
process of giving symbolic meaning to stimuli of the 
empirical world.
6) Opportunities to receive extrinsic rewards, 
intrinsic rewards and role identity support are limited. 
Actors receive rewards through encounters and sustained 
relationships. Managing opportunity structures and 
managing investments of identities are means for 
maximizing interaction profits in a finite world.
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Research findings generally show that concern for
personal death is based on enacted and imagined social
and personal roles„ Since the person embraces multiple
roles, perceived consequences of death are contradictory;
overall, they appear to be ambivalent. Ambivalence toward
death is found by those using different methodological
12designs and by those studying different populations.
More specifically, a foreshortened time perspective and 
perceptions of limited opportunities for experiences and 
role enactment are usually found to be related to 
contemplating death. General anxiety, concern for health, 
being female, motherhood, a high degree of succorance, 
endorsement of sexual pleasures, resistance to change, 
an external locus of control and low self-esteem are 
additional factors relating to a death concern that is 
intense enough to suggest how it motivates behavior.
These findings invite propositions regarding how 
perceptions of finitude affect the self for those 
overly concerned with death.
In summary, the role identity model presents an
12Ambivalence, as a typical response, is dis­
cussed by researchers who examine various units of 
analysis when exploring death concern0 For example,
H. Feifel (1959) and I. E. Alexander and A. M.
Adlerstein (1958) focus upon the individual’s ambivalent 
responses. Sociologists also research and analyze 
’’American” ambivalence; e.g., see Parsons et al. (19 73)
and Dumont and Foss (1972).
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explanation for an emergent self that seeks rewards for 
idealized roles through interaction0 The model suggests
' i
a reciprocal relationship between perceptions of death 
and the self that is observable through empirical 
research. Since death is a personal event that terminates 
the self, and it affects intimate others, the model 
appears ideal for explaining how actors construct 
meanings for the self in a finite world. Although the 
authors consider ways in which actors constrain each 
other's overt and covert behaviors, they adopt a 
voluntaristic postulate that can limit the model's 
explanatory power. They acknowledge mechanisms of social 
control are "regrettably omitted" by their framework. 
Because death can represent the ultimate form of social 
control, research on dying and death that is amenable to 
conformity and cognitive dissonance analysis enables 
generalizations that explain how social control affects 
the self and definitions of personal death. Comparing 
these analyses to those implied by the McCall and Simmons 
framework is a means for examining the adequacy of 
different perspectives.
CHAPTER IV 
CONFORMITY AND COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
Social control refers to mechanisms that inter- 
actants use to reduce or eliminate deviance (Crosbie, 
1975: 510). Since it can be achieved through rewarding 
conformity or through the redefinition of constructs, 
exploring dying and death literature with theories of 
conformity and cognitive dissonance is worthwhile.
Kiesler and Kiesler define conformity as a 
"change in behavior or belief toward a group as a result 
of real or imagined group pressure" (1969: 2).
Researchers disect the concept into two dimensions for 
the purposes*of observation. Informational conformity, 
private acceptance of group norms and conviction are 
terms used to describe acquiescence to the standards 
and beliefs of others when no external pressures for 
conformity exist. Normative conformity or compliance 
is a response to at least an imagined pressure to 
conform. Meeting others' expectations brings approval 
and fulfills informational needs; neglecting expectations 
evokes rejection and disapproval.
The conformity process is complex, often includes 
combinations of the above dimensions, and is explained
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by several social psychological theories. Festinger’s 
social comparison theory (1954) offers an explanation for 
informational conformity and is the basis for several 
research efforts. The model posits that individuals 
attempt to establish social support for beliefs in order 
to avoid anxiety and uncertainty. A drive for "social 
reality" encourages a change in opinions or beliefs in 
order to receive rewarding support from others. Festinger 
contends that individuals compare themselves to similar 
others (1954: 123) thereby suggesting that informational 
conformity has a greater influence on the opinions of 
disagreeing but not extremely different others. Role 
theories which posit that behavior is governed by the 
expectations for an incumbent role, to gain rewards and 
avoid negative sanctions from a. role partner, are used 
to explain situationally specific normative conformity 
(Turner, 1968). Exchange theories that focus upon 
rewards for acquiescence also predict compliance 
(Homans, 1961).
When conformity is treated as an independent 
variable, the above perspectives suggest that the 
process affects ongoing interaction, group stabiliza­
tion, group structure and cohesion, social control of 
members and the distribution of resources (Crosbie, 1975: 
431-442). These effects are found within dying and 
death literature. Glaser and Strauss (1965) and Gubrium
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(1975) find that nonconformity to behavioral expectations 
of a hospital or nursing home invites avoidance by staff 
members, and tactics to encourage conformity. "Herding” 
patients to day rooms in nursing homes and reassigning 
terminal, disruptive patients within a hospital are 
mechanisms for social control.
Research on terminally ill patients demonstrates 
that persons who accept upcoming death conform not only 
to behavioral expectations, but also to the beliefs of 
others concerning imminent demise. The Glaser and 
Strauss "open awareness" context suggests that all 
interactants are aware that death is unavoidable. This 
belief, that a life will soon end, affects expectations 
of staff, families and patients. In this situation, a 
patient cannot check information received against known 
facts, since death is literally unknowable and the exact 
time and circumstances of the event are unknowable. The 
individual must accept the standards and beliefs of 
others as evidence for reality. Acquiescence to beliefs 
concerning death allows interaction with family members 
in preparation for death. Arrangements for funerals and 
the disposition of goods upon death, requests for 
spiritual guidance in preparation for an afterlife, and 
discussions concerning life’s experiences are common for 
the accepting patient. Denial of death can remove the 
patient from others’ preparation for his death, thus
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encouraging a premature separation.^
Lofland (1978) examines case studies to explore 
how individuals construct dying roles and how others 
respond to emergent roles. She finds the dying, to a 
certain degree, sense freedom from many social expecta­
tions and often perceive option in shaping a unique 
dying role. However, role partners impose sanctions 
for what they consider inappropriate behaviors. Lofland 
concludes "undoubtedly, for most who confront the dying 
role . . the problem of construction is control"
(1978: 19).
Because the dying find themselves in settings that 
cannot tolerate deviance or in circumstances that restrict 
behaviors, it is not surprising to discover a large 
degree of conformity among the terminally ill. The 
Kubler-Ross (1969) thesis that suggests individuals 
generally "accept" death is explained by conformity.
The dying accept others1 beliefs concerning mortality. 
Acceptance brings continued interaction with nursing staff
13Spiegel's (1977) study on grief and anticipatory 
grief is based on interviews with mourners and, a review 
of related literature. He concludes that anticipatory 
grief, or preparing for death by grieving before the 
event, includes rehearsals for loss by gradual and 
progressive separation from the individual before 
death. The patient influences the process. He can 
either continue to make decisions as long as he is con­
scious, or can allow others to respond to him as if he 
were absent from the group.
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and family (Glaser and Strauss, 1965). The dying can con­
tinue to be integral group members and maintain approval, 
status and other group issued rewards. Since conformity 
can describe and predict the content of a dying role it 
appears to provide a limited understanding of how inter­
action shapes behavior among those encountering death. 
However, it does not enhance an understanding of how the 
healthy, including those concerned with future death, 
conform to a finite nature.
Kiesler and Kiesler identify group pressure as 
the mechanism that explains effectiveness of conformity. 
"Group pressure is a psychological force operating upon 
a person to fulfill others’ expectations . . especially
those expectations of others relating to the person's 
'roles' or to behaviors specified or implied by the 
'norms' of the group to which he belongs" (1969: 31).
The McCall and Simmons model posits that the "personal" 
roles, or those factors that uniquely shape one's inter­
active roles, are components of the self that extend 
the boundaries of norms and social roles. Rather than 
enact a mechanistic script applicable to mortal people, 
the individual gives meaning to life plans and projects 
that often transcend his finitude. There are no "group 
pressures” to live a mortal, limiting life for those who 
can symbolize the event of personal death.
Among theories of cognitive inconsistency,
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Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance is most useful 
for exploring how perceptions of death can operate as 
mechanisms of social control. Generally, congruity 
theories posit that rational man has a need for 
homeostasis. Heider's (1958) classical Gestalt stance 
contends that inconsistencies concerning the person and 
his environment exist within the phenomenological 
stimulus field. For Heider, needs represent stimulus 
field dynamics rather than specialized motivational 
states. Osgood (1960) and Festinger (1957) are among 
those who conceptualize inconsistencies as drives, 
similar in nature to physiological drives.
The conceptual unit of dissonance theory is the 
cognitive element, or a knowledge, opinion, or belief 
about the environment, oneself, or one's attitudes. 
Relations between cognitions can be consonant, 
irrelevant, or dissonant. If one cognition (or set of 
cognitions) psychologically implies the other, the 
relationship is consonant. If one implies the opposite 
of the other, the relationship is dissonant.
Relationships are based on the individual’s perceptions, 
and do not necessarily represent logical relationships. 
Experiencing dissonance is a motivational state for the 
person. The amount, or magnitude, depends on percep­
tions of relevance. A seminal component of Festinger’s 
theory is its predictions for changing cognitions. The
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resistance to change cognitive elements is determined by 
the clarity of "reality” and by the difficulty of changing 
cognitions. Ambiguous or abstract elements have a 
relatively low resistance to change (Wicklund and Brehm, 
1976). Personal death, especially for the nondying 
individual, represents an abstract, seemingly unknowable 
event. Thus, responses to thoughts about death should 
not be resistant to change.
Dissonance is created by decision making, forced 
compliance, or by the exposure to information. It cannot 
be eliminated but it can be reduced to a manageable 
level. Eliminating cognitions, reducing their importance, 
adding new cognitive elements or increasing their 
importance reduce dissonance. The resistance to change 
of the most relevant cognitions determines which method 
is used.
Wicklund and Brehm (19 76) outline the implications 
of the three distinct paradigms of the Festinger theory.
1) When a person chooses between attractive 
alternatives he experiences dissonance that can 
be reduced by magnifying the attractiveness of 
the chosen alternative and by reducing the 
attractiveness of the rejected alternative;
2) When a person is "forced" to engage in 
behavior that he would normally avoid, he 
experiences dissonance that can be reduced by 
coming to favor the behavior in which he has 
engaged;
3) When a person is experiencing dissonance with 
regard to some issue, he will tend to seek 
dissonance-reducing information, and
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correspondingly, he will tend to avoid dissonance-
increasing information.
In order to interpret dying and death studies with 
the principles of cognitive dissonance, it is necessary 
to demonstrate an unfitting relation between cognitive 
elements. The cognition "I am mortal” can obviously 
conflict with many attitudes, intentions and behaviors of 
the individual,, Furthermore, since anxiety is a tension 
state and since dissonance is a tension state, it is 
likely that some dimensions of death anxiety can be 
discerned as dissonance.
Disaster studies demonstrate that clear, concrete 
facts show man his mortal nature; facts that are highly 
resistent to change. Survivors of the Buffalo Creek 
flood dream of drowning, feel guilt for living and 
generally find resolution for the trauma to be problem­
atic. Hiroshima victims respond similarly and acknowledge 
membership in a stigmatizing group that is defined by 
death. Both groups of survivors manifest anxieties and 
phobia that disrupt previously routinized interaction 
patterns. Buffalo Creek survivors became alienated from 
each other (Erikson, 1976), and Hiroshima survivors 
report marriage and employment restrictions (Lifton,
1976). For these individuals, managing the large degree 
of dissonance aroused by death confrontation is difficult, 
if not impossible.
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When death concern is conceptualized as a source 
of dissonance, those with high death anxiety can be 
compared to those with low death anxiety to explore 
mechanisms for managing dissonance. Among other charac­
teristics, high death anxiety is related to an external 
locus of control (Sadowski et al., 1979-80), a present 
time orientation (Dickstein and Blatt, 1976), resistance 
to change (Dickstein, 1972) and low self-esteem (Davis 
et al., 19 78). Perceiving that external events shape 
behavior is analogous to forced compliance. Dissonance 
theory would predict a high degree of death concern for 
those with high externality since the person acknowledges 
the impossibility of avoiding death. Preferring the 
present, avoiding thoughts about the future and resisting 
change are congruent with anxiety about nonexistence. A 
person with low self-esteem senses little efficacy and 
might therefore not sense capability to control life's 
tasks before death. Thus, dissonance theory appears 
capable of explaining the relationships between fear of 
death and perceptions of present experiences for some 
individuals.
Researchers often find that the elderly and the 
terminally ill manifest low death anxiety compared to 
other groups, although they often acknowledge death is 
imminent (Nerke, 1974; Swenson, 1959). Since there is 
no choice in selecting age or one's health, perhaps these
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people reduce death related dissonance by rejecting the 
negative aspects of terminality. This inference is 
supported by the Swenson (1959) and Fiefel (1973) studies 
that suggest some terminally ill or elderly people look 
forward to personal death.
Some psychoanalytically oriented researchers posit 
denial alleviates tension or anxiety experienced from 
thoughts about death. Weisman's (1972) findings, based 
on clinical case studies, fit dissonance theory predic­
tions. He writes, "only the fact of death is final; 
everything else is uncertain and inconclusive" (Weisman, 
1972: xvi). Death can be postponed and postulating non­
existence is an illogical exercise. Weisman posits that 
three types of denial are commonly found among those who 
sense a threat of death. First order denial is based 
upon perceptions of the preliminary facts of an illness, 
second order denial refers to perceived implications of 
a terminal illness and third order denial is concerned 
with "the image of death itself: denial of extinction." 
This research interprets denial as a mechanism that 
helps nullify the constant threat of nonexistence while 
encouraging individuals to participate in a limiting 
and limited world. The terminally ill often engage in 
what Weisman labels middle knowledge regarding death:
Patients seem to know and want to know, yet they 
often talk as if they did not know and did not 
want to be reminded of what they have been told.
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Many patients rebuke their doctors for not having 
warned them about complications in treatment or 
the course of an illness, even though the 
doctors may have been scrupulous about keeping 
them informed.
To deny the upcoming event, patients or those threatened 
with death seek information consonant with a desire for 
life, even if it involves misperceiving critical infor­
mation .
The most obvious group of individuals who attempt 
to reduce dissonance concerning death awareness through 
denial are members of "immortalist" organizations. Over 
one million Americans pay membership dues in order to 
attend meetings and to receive newsletters containing 
information on the latest procedures to forestall death 
(Simpson, 1979: 23). Such thoughts as "it is not 
essential that we die „ . . the only reason we do is
that we don't know any better, We agree that physical 
immortality is the intended goal of human evolution" are 
dispersed throughout immortalist literature (Otto, 1979:
4). Denial of death is an apparent dissonance reducer 
for those who are dying as well as for those whose 
death is an unforeseeable future event. Selective 
interaction and seeking selective information are 
mechanisms that individuals use to deny eventual death. 
Although some circumstances absolutely prevent 
denial, dissonance theory should predict behaviors or 
attitudes that demonstrate attempts to manage the
tensions associated with acknowledged mortality. 
Psychological closure, the inability to "feel,” found 
among disaster survivors (Lifton, 1976;, Eriks on,. 1976) i 
one observed response that verifies the dissonance model 
Frankl's (1963) reflections on experiences in a con­
centration camp suggest apathy, or the inability to 
"care," is another. As a camp physician, he constantly 
witnessed death, while realizing that his own life was 
threatened. He writes, "the corpse which had just been 
removed stared in at me with glazed eyes. Two hours 
before I had spoken to that man. Now I continued 
sipping my soup" (1963: 35). To survive, Frankl 
espoused his "human freedom--to choose one's attitude 
in any given set of circumstances, to choose one's own 
way." He concludes that the camp restricted life, 
but the person's inner decisions shaped identity as it 
emerged under death awareness conditions.
The dissonance model appears useful for explain­
ing variance in ways individuals cope with death concern 
Life, compared to death, is attractive for most people. 
Those who have opportunities can engage in selective 
interaction or seek selective information to reduce 
death concern. Those with seemingly little or no choice 
can enhance beliefs that dying and death have meaning 
and that a degree of personal freedom exists when con­
fronting personal- death.
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Since the reduction of dissonance often involves 
redefinition of important cognitions or clusters of 
cognitions, it is possible that it operates as a mechanism 
for social control that affects the emergent self and the 
individual's perceptions of personal death. However, 
research on dissonance invariably occurs in the labora­
tory (Wicklund and Brehm, 19 76); this places a consider­
able restriction on exploring the question. Only post 
hoc inferences allow the analyst to posit reciprocal 
relationships between death and the self when relying 
solely upon the dissonance model. Theoretically, it 
appears more suitable than conformity processes for 
explaining and predicting how death concern influences 
the self. In its extreme form,, dissonance represents a 
discrepancy between an idealized and actual self. An 
examination of how symbolizing individuals cope with 
limited worlds could be a salient issue for those who 
adopt a cognitive dissonance perspective.
CHAPTER V 
A SYNTHESIS
The McCall and Simmons role identity model and 
Festinger's cognitive dissonance theory can both explain 
and predict relationships between death and the self. 
Comparing the utility of models with an appropriate 
"critical experiment" design is impossible because of 
the substantive area of research. Each approach has 
obvious advantages and disadvantages; each can explain 
some of the unknown amount of variance in responses to 
thoughts about personal death,-
The role identity model specifies possible 
cognitive and expressive behaviors of adults who are 
concerned with terminality. It produces testable 
propositions, but it is somewhat restricted by its 
neglect of social control which affects a processual 
self. The dissonance model directly assesses the 
tension generated by a consciousness of finitude and 
generally suggests means for managing tension. It 
doesn't specify how or why dissonance is aroused when 
an individual considers future death and it doesn't 
necessarily identify specific ways to reduce death 
related dissonance. Only inferences allow predictions
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based on one of the three major components of the model 
because most propositions of the theory are amendable 
only to experimental designs. Since active, creating 
man is inevitably constrained by his limited nature, it 
appears the models complement each other. Their 
integration should produce a powerful device for explain­
ing variance in cognitive and expressive responses to 
thoughts about personal death. Moreover, both processual 
models examine the individual's interpretations of 
reality. Observing the emergent self who defines and 
responds to perceptions of future death would enable the 
refinement of theories that explain motivated behavior.
Glaser and Strauss (1971) discuss "substantive 
theory" as a link between empirical data and formal 
theory. Formal theory can be'generated by either 
"rewriting" substantive theory in order to extend its 
generalizability, or by comparing substantive theories 
to locate common explanatory elements. The relevance 
of constructing substantive theory on dying and death 
perceptions concerns its ability to contribute to a 
cumulative body of knowledge that enables development 
of empirically based formal theory. For example, 
theory and research on dying can be compared to theory 
and research on separation or loss that has similar 
implications to death. Substantive theory on responses 
to imagined consequences of death could provide direction
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for developing conceptual categories, properties of 
categories, and hypotheses to test conceptual links. In 
the particular instance.-of death research, the use of 
broad theoretical frameworks that consider the indivi­
dual's ability to construct reality is necessary for 
initial conceptualization because personal death is 
objectively an unknown. This direction suggests an 
approach to explaining behavior that gives the individual 
credit for defining his social reality can benefit from 
substantive theory on dying and death.
It is beyond the scope of this project to 
empirically investigate the utility of theory on death 
and the self. However, hypothesis construction is 
possible. The balance of this effort summarizes thoughts 
that emerged from considering dying and death studies 
within the boundaries of cognitive dissonance and role 
identity frameworks. The summary is presented to outline 
components of a causal process format of substantive 
theory (Turner, 1978). Abstract and concrete concepts 
are defined and operationalized. Existence statements 
describe situations in which relational statements apply.
Death refers to the termination of human experi­
ence. It represents the ultimate limit imposed upon the 
self, behavior, plans, and abstract goals. The self is 
a social object that emerges through interaction. It is 
composed of idealized social and personal roles, or role
95
identities, that motivate behavior.
The content of role identities is affected by
perceptions of death. Idealisms are shaped by acknow-.
ledged and personally defined limits. As interaction 
partners exit through death, the content of role 
identities reflects the loss of social objects as well 
as an awareness of future loss.
A person constructs interactive roles that 
reflect his concern with death. The idiosyncratic 
portion of an interactive role includes personality 
characteristics that are related to high death concern. 
Thus, attributes such as succorance, heterosexuality, 
external control and low self-esteem can potentially 
affect the interactive role in any situation. When an 
individual selects an interactive role, based on these 
characteristics, he will magnify the attractiveness of 
its components while reducing the attractiveness of 
alternative lines of action.
Since hierarchies of prominence and salience are 
largely determined by perceived opportunity for rewards, 
a person concerned with personal death should place 
identities that can gain immediate rewards in more 
prominent positions than those relying upon the future. 
This factor should therefore affect both the person's 
situational selves as well as his holistic self.
Since perceiving opportunities is based on
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symbolizing the empirical world, a person concerned with 
his death will sense contradictory opportunity structures. 
Perceiving limits and constraints rather than broad 
opportunities for some role performances should be 
typical. Simultaneously, the high death concern indivi­
dual will seek opportunities that enhance his perceived 
freedom from the constraints of some social expectations. 
This implies that opportunity structures will psychologi­
cally fit the person’s perceptions of his limiting 
world.
Audiences chosen by the death concerned person 
can reflect self-imposed temporal boundaries.
Relationships based on attachment or dependability 
of.rewards might be sought more often than those based 
on commitment0 Logistical management should reflect 
these choices and short term agendas should dominate 
the interaction time budget. Audiences chosen will 
provide the person with information congruent with 
perceptions of a limited world.
When negotiating identities, processes of 
altercasting and the presentation of self will reflect 
death concern. Although audiences demand various 
interactive roles, ego can cast alter with a character 
that fulfills needs such as succorance, heterosexuality, 
and immediacy for rewards. A high death concerned ego 
should present the self in a manner that displays factors
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such as anxiety, resistance to change and concern with the 
present.
These propositions, suggest interrelated role 
identities, interactive roles, hierarchies and perceived 
opportunity structures, of which all determine the 
self, can be affected by concern for death. The role 
identity model also suggests how the. individual actively 
defines his reality, and therefore attaches meaning to 
death. The process of interpretation implies the 
person doesn’t respond to a physical, objective reality; 
rather he responds to a social definition of reality.
Death is symbolic. "What is essential is that the
symbol should arouse in one’s self what it arouses in 
the other individual” (Mead, 1934: 149). Interactants 
give meaning to death and act upon it as a social 
object. Interaction partners, content of communication 
with others, content of mind activity and interpreting 
empirically observed events of the actor’s world are 
among factors that contribute to the individual’s 
definition of personal death. All these factors arise 
in everyday behavior with others that is motivated by 
a need to receive support for prominent identities and 
constrained by self defined limits. The person with 
several enacted and imagined roles interacts with 
countless others in numerous settings. The content of 
each role identity implies a consequence of death.
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Therefore, the overall meanings of death are inherently 
complex and probably contradictory for most individuals.
McCall and Simmons suggest procedures for. 
identifying and measuring role identity hierarchies and 
their reciprocal relationship with perceptions of death.
A Twenty Statements Test. (TST)^ that intends to assess 
self-conceptions of social roles, combined with semi­
structured interviews to explore categories of social 
roles can be used to specify identities. The question 
MHow do you like to think of yourself being or acting
as a(n) _________?" enables descriptions of the content
of various idealized roles (McCall and Simmons, 1978: 254).
14Spitzer et al. (1971) discuss several advantages 
of the TST, an instrument designed to measure the self.
It involves a social psychological conception of self; 
i.e., the person relates himself to his social context.
It assumes the self consists of complex meanings, actors 
interpret and define social reality and meanings, and 
social objects cluster. Responding to "Who Am I?" 
elicits conscious, salient attitudes about the self,
i.e., about the person as a social object. Theoretical 
and methodological assumptions of the TST are empirically 
verifiable. Researchers use this measure more frequently 
than any others to measure the self. Validity infor­
mation available is at least equal to that available 
on other instruments that measure self concept.
Numerous scoring procedures can be used and the instru­
ment allows reliable codingo Variables operationalized 
by the measure are found to be correlated with several 
behaviors (pp. 73-111). Finally, the format can be 
used to measure other social objects. Cottrell (1971) 
is among those who discuss disadvantages of the TST 
approach. He finds the instrument assumes a "static" 
self. Researchers can intrude interpretations during 
administration of the test and can make invalid 
inferences when interpreting results.
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Relating six factors: self-support, social support, 
intrinsic gratification, extrinsic gratification, degree 
of commitment and degree of investment for each role 
identity and specifying the relative importance of each 
factor, allows determination of a role identity prominence 
hierarchy, or idealized self. The order of responses 
on a TST infers salience of identities. Respondents can 
also rate specific interactive roles according to 
perceived utility (McCall and Simmons, 1978: 260-264).
The TST format for measuring death concern (Bakshis 
et al., 1974) complemented by the Dickstein Death Concern 
Scale (1972) enable and understanding of the perceived 
consequences of death, as well as a reasonable assess­
ment of anxiety or dissonance created by death awareness. 
Direct observations of altercasting and presentation of 
self allow for an examination of the negotiation of 
identities (Weinstein and Deutschberger, 1963) that 
are affected by death concern. Since a considerable 
amount of literature suggests characteristics of those 
overly concerned with personal death, identifying 
participants for this form of research--one that seeks 
an understanding for the nature of concern--would not 
be problematic. Although this design is applicable only 
to an intensive study of a small number of individuals, 
it ameliorates some of the restrictions of purely
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15quantitative studies that usually rely upon narrow 
conceptualizations of death concern and produce dead 
level abstraction type findings..
The preceding pages demonstrate that some 
individuals experience a high degree of death concern, 
some manifest contradictory responses to thoughts about 
personal death and some respond ambivalently to death. 
Considering social roles and personality characteristics 
is necessary in order to understand the source and 
nature of death concern. Although psychologists have 
explored the relationships between death anxiety and 
personality, there is an apparent lack of sociological 
investigation in the general area. Since research 
designs are capable of examining and measuring the 
self, as well as thoughts about personal death, 
integrating the concepts appears essential in order to 
understand how the person defines and is constrained by 
his mortal nature. Although the products of this 
effort are limited to statements, they emerged from 
empirical research findings and theoretical propositions
’’Quantitative" studies refer to those discussed 
in chapter two that often involve administration of a 
single instrument to one population in order to examine 
correlations between measures of death concern and a 
narrowly defined set of personality traits, attitudes or 
behaviors. Although a compilation of studies identifies 
key characteristics of the death concerned person, indivi­
dual efforts do not often permit generalizations.
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on purposeful behavior. Perhaps they suggest a*beginning 
for understanding thoughts expressed by those who try to 
communicate an ambivalence toward life and death; "The 
memory came faint and cold of the story I might have 
told, a story in the likeness of my life, I' mean without 
the courage to end or the strength to go on" (Beckett).
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APPENDIX A
DEATH ANXIETY SCALE 
Donald I. Templer
The Journal of General Psychology 82:167 (1970)
(Key)
T. I am very much afraid to die.
F The thought of death.seldom enters my mind.
F It doesn't make me nervous when people talk about 
death.
T I dread to think about having to have an operation.
F I am not at all afraid to die.
F I am not particularly afraid of getting cancer.
F The thought of death never bothers me.
T I am often distressed by the way time flies so
very rapidly.
T I fear dying a painful death.
T The subject of life after death troubles me greatly.
T I am really scared of having a heart attack.
T I often.think about how short life really is.
T I shudder when I hear people talking about a World
War III.
T The sight of a dead body is horrifying to me.
F I feel that the future holds nothing for me to fear.
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APPENDIX B
DEATH CONCERN SCALE
Louis S. Dickstein
Psychological Reports 30:565 (1972)
1. I think about my own death.
2. I think about the death of loved ones.
3. I think about dying young0 /
4. I think about the possibility of being killed on a 
city streeto
5. I have fantasies of my own death.
6. I think about death just before going to sleep.
7. I think of how I would act if I knew I were to die 
within a given period of time.
8. I think about how my relatives would act and feel 
upon my death.
9. When I am sick I think about death.
10. When I am outside during a lightning storm I think 
about the possibility of being struck by lightning.
11. When I am in an automobile I think about the high 
incidence of traffic accidents.
12. I think people should first become concerned about 
death when they are old.
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13. I am muctL more concerned about my death than those 
around me.
14. Death hardly concerns me.
15. My general outlook just doesn't allow for morbid 
thoughts„
16. The prospect of my own death arouses anxiety in me.
17. The prospect of my own death depresses me.
18o The prospect of the death of my loved ones arouses
anxiety in me.
19. The knowledge that I will surely die does not in
any way affect the conduct of my life.
20. I envision my own death as a painful, nightmarish 
experience.
21o I am afraid of dying.
22. I am afraid of being dead'.
23o Many people become disturbed at the sight of a new 
grave but it doesn't bother me.
24. I am disturbed when I think about the shortness of 
life.
25. Thinking about death is a waste of time.
26. Death should not be regarded as a tragedy if it
occurs after a productive life.
27. The inevitable death of man poses a serious challenge 
to the meaningfulness of human existence.
28. The death of the individual is ultimately beneficial 
because it facilitates change in society.
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29.
30.
I have a desire to live on after death. 
The question of whether or not there is 
life worries me considerably.
future
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APPENDIX C
ACCEPTANCE OF DEATH ITEMS
Leo Klug and Marvin Ross
P sychological Re p o rt s 40:910 (1977)
1. I accept the fact of my inevitable death.
2. Reflecting on death helps me appreciate life more.
3. I discuss death when the occasion presents itself.
4. I have reconciled myself to the reality of my own 
inevitable death,
5. I have consciously contemplated the fact that one 
day I will die.
6. In my own life I have come to grips with the fact 
of my inevitable death,
7. When death comes 1*11 be ready.
8. I am quite conscious of the fact that one day I 
will die.
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APPENDIX D
CONSEQUENCES OF ONE'S OWN DEATH
James C. Diggory and Doreen Z„ Rothman
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 63:205 (1961)
A. I could no longer have any experiences.
B. I am uncertain as to what might happen to me if there 
is a life after deatho
C. I am afraid of what might happen to my body after 
death.
D. I could no longer care for my dependents.
E. My death would cause grief for my relatives and 
friends.
F. All my plans and projects would come to an end.
G. The process of dying might be painful.
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